INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

B. A. SANSKRIT

THIRD SEMESTER

2011 Admission onwards

Complementary Course

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

CALICUT UNIVERSITY.P.O., MALAPPURAM, KERALA, INDIA – 673 635
UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

STUDY MATERIAL

BA SANSKRIT

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COMPLEMENTARY COURSE

INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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Introduction

The Vedas are Original sources of Indian Philosophy and are called impersonal since they were transmitted from one generation to the next by word of month, from one teacher (guru) to his disciple. For the same reason they are also called Śruti. They also contain considerable information regarding religion and moral behavior of the Vedic People. Traditionally, it is accepted that there are four Vedas- The Ṛigveda - The Yajurveda - The Sāmaveda and The Atharva veda. Despite this division, they are all a single compendium of knowledge and the division is made on the basis of the subject and the nature of the hymns contained in each section. The subject matter of the Vedas is more broadly divided in to two parts - The Karma Kāṇḍa and Jñāna Kāṇḍa. Logically viewed, the Karma Kāṇḍa is older then the Jñāna Kāṇḍa, but both are accepted as intimately related to each other. Both are required to achieve the terrestrial and transcendental objectives of man. The vedas provide numerous theories to explain creation, one of which is the existence of an Omnipotent and Omniscient power. In addition the Vedas also contain lengthy deliberations on the subject of moral conduct, Sin and virtue, the theory of Karma and numerous other philosophical and ethical subjects.

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the earliest literary record of the Indo - European race. It is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses have been offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. Max - muller supposed the date to be 1200BC. Hang 2400 BC and Balgangaadhara Tilak 4000BC, The ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of unknown antiquity; and the Hindus generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was therefore generally supposed that either they were taught by god to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the sages who were the “Seers” (मन्त्रकुटुंबक: ) of the hymns. The Vedas are the oldest extant literary monument of the Aryan mind. The Origin of Indian Philosophy may be easily traced in the vedas. Thus in short we may say that inspite of the many changes that time has wrought, the Indian life may still be regarded in the main as and adumbration of the Vedic life, which had never ceased to shed its light all through the past.

The early phase of development of Indian Philosophy is not clear. We can trace back the origin of most of the systems to sometime between 600 BC and 100 or 200 BC, but there are conflicting claims about the order in which these systems came into being, since they all existed simultaneously at some point and did so through a continuous chain of teachers and pupils till a bout the 17th century AD. Buddha's teachings led to the development of Buddhist philosophy sometime around 500 BC. Jaina
Philosophy is said to be prior in origin to Buddhism. The references to the School of materialism found in early Buddhist literature provide the evidence that it is also older than Buddhism. It has been speculated that the systems of Sāmkhya, Yoga, Mimāmsa, Nyāya and Vedanta and possibly even Vaisesika existed in their elementary forms even before Buddhism and Jainism, but since their elaborate works were written later, they are usually discussed after Buddhism and Jainism. In total, there were nine Schools of thought in Indian Philosophy. So far as the later phase of their development is concerned, some dates are available and it is possible for us to determine the timeframe and order in which their respective thinkers existed.

Dr. Radhakrishnan has distinguished between the different periods of India Philosophy. He maintains the following broad divisions:

1) **The Vedic Period (1500 BC to 600 BC)** - This Period denotes the settlement and expansion of the Aryans. Although there is not much philosophy in this pre-Upanishadic era, we cannot deny the 'beginnings of sublime idealism of India'. Dr. Radhakrishnan says, 'The views put forward in this age are not philosophical in the technical sense of the term. It is the age of groping, where superstition and thought are yet in conflict.' (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 8th ed., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, 1966, p.57.)

2) **The Epic Period (600 BC to AD 200)** - This period covers the age between early Upanishads and the various systems or schools of Philosophy. It put forth the idea of relations between God and Man as depicted in the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata. The roots of Buddhism, Jainism, Saivism, and Vaishnavism lie in this period. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan, 'In this period we have also the great democratization of the Upanishadic ideas in Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā. The development of abstract though which culminated in the Schools of Indian Philosophy, the oarsanas, belongs to this period.' (S. Radhakrishna, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, 8th ed., George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1966, pp.57-58)

3) **The Sūtra Period (From AD 200)** - This period witnessed such a rapid growth in the volume of literature of the various schools of philosophy that it gave rise to sutras as a means of encapsulating the literary works. The concept of commentaries emerged to further facilitate the understanding of these sutras. Whereas the active minds discussed and debated philosophical issues in the earlier period, this period critically analysed the ability of the human mind to address philosophical Problems. Radhakrishnan holds that 'The earlier efforts to understand and interpret the world were not strictly philosophical attempts, since they were not troubled by any scruples about competition of the human mind or the efficiency of the instrument and the criteria employed.' (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1,8th ed., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, 1966, p.58)

4) **The Scholastic period (from AD 200)** - This period is not very distinct from the previous one. The renown of scholars like Kumārila, Śankara, Rāmānuja, Śrīdhara, Madhwa, Vācaspati, Udaayna, Bhāskara, Jayanta, Vijñānabhinshu, and Raghunatha illuminates this age. Along with some very valuable
texts, this period unfortunately also saw a lot of literary exercises being reduced to polemics that generated controversies. (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, 8th ed., George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1966, P.59.) The saving grace for this period was the path of spiritual discovery reaffirmed by people like Samkara and Ramanuja.

The etymological meaning of the word 'Philosophy' is 'love of learning'. It signifies a natural and a necessary urge in human beings to know themselves and the world in which they 'live and move and have their being'. It is impossible for man to live without a philosophy. Western Philosophy has remained more or less true to the etymological meaning of 'Philosophy', in being essentially an intellectual quest for truth. Indian Philosophy has been, however intensely spiritual and has always emphasized the need of practical realization of truth. To understand Indian Philosophy one must fully grasp the meaning of the word 'Darshana'. The word 'Darshana' is derived from the Sanskrit root 'Dris', which means to see, with the lyut pratayaya, in the sense of Instrument, added to it. It means, that through the instrumentality of which something is to be seen. Thus the word 'Darshana' means 'Vision' and also the 'Instrument of Vision'. It stands for the direct, immediate and intuitive Vision reality, the actual perception of truth, and also includes the means which lead to this realization. 'See the Self (आत्मा बा अर ब्रह्मय:) is the keynote of all Schools of Indian Philosophy. Annihilation of the three kinds of pains - ādhyātmika (Physical and mental sufferings Produced by natural and intra-organic causes), ādhibhautika (Physical and mental sufferings Produced by natural and extra-organic causes), and ādhidaitika (Physical and mental sufferings produced by super natural and extra-Organic causes) and realization of Supreme happiness is the end, and śravana (hearing the truth), manana (intellectual conviction after critical analysis) and Nīdidhyāsana (Practical realization) are the means - in almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy.

Classification of Vedic Literature

The name 'Veda' (knowledge) stands for the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas (Mantra - Brāhmaṇayor veda-nāmadheyam). Mantra means a hymn addressed to some god or goddess. The collection of the Mantras is called 'Samhitā'. There are four Samhitās - Ṛk, Sāma, Yajuṅ and Atharva. These are said to be compiled for the smooth performance of the Vedic sacrifices. A Vedic sacrifice needs four main priests - Hotā, who addresses hymns in praise of the gods to invoke their presence and participation in the sacrifice; Udgātā, who sings the hymns in sweet musical tones to entertain and please the gods; Adhvaryu, who performs the sacrifice according to the strict ritualistic code and gives offerings to the gods; and Brahmā, who is the general supervisor well-versed in all the Vedas. The four Samhitās are said to be compiled to fulfill the needs of these four main priests - Ṛk for the Hotā, Sāma for the Udgātā, Yajuṅ for the Adhvaryu and Atharva for the Brahmā. Sometimes the Vedas are referred to only as 'Trayī', omitting the Atharva. Ṛk means a verse, Sāma means a song; Yajuṅ means a prose passage. Thus we see that the Samhitā-bhāga or the Mantra - portion of the Veda is the Hymnology addressed to the various gods and goddesses. Ṛk- Samhitā is regarded as the oldest and also the most important. The
Ṛṣis of the Vedas are not the authors, but only the 'seers' of the Mantras (ṛṣayo mantra- draṣṭārahaḥ). The Brāhmaṇas, unlike the Mantras, are written in prose. They are the elaboration of the complicated ritualism of the Vedas. They deal with the rules and regulations laid down for the performance of the rites and the sacrifices. Their name 'Brāhmaṇa' is derived from the word 'Brahman' which originally means a prayer. There is little philosophy in these, though some philosophical ideas flash here and there in the course of some speculative digressions. The appendages to these Brāhmaṇas are called Āraṇyakas mainly because they were composed in the calmness of the forests. The Āraṇyakas mark the transition from the ritualistic to the philosophic thought. We find here a mystic interpretation of the Vedic sacrifices. The concluding portions of the Āraṇyakas are called the Upaniṣads. These are intensely philosophical and spiritual and may be rightly regarded as the cream of the Vedic philosophy. The Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas are called the Karma - Kāṇḍa or the portion dealing with the sacrificial actions, and the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads are called the Jñāna-Kāṇḍa. The Upaniṣads are also known as 'Vedānta' or 'the end of the Veda', firstly because they are literally the concluding portion, the end, of the Vedas, and Secondly because they are the essence, the cream, the height, of the Vedic philosophy.

The Upaniṣads are the foundation of Indian Philosophy. The Systems of Indian Philosophy are systematic speculations on the nature of the Reality in harmony with the teachings of the Upaniṣads, which contain various aspects of truth. Indian Philosophy is based on the logical; reason subordinate to the authority of the Vedas. Which are believed to embody the intuitions of seers of truth. So Indian Philosophy is based on rational speculation in harmony with the Vedas, and aims at achieving the highest perfection (moksa) attainable in humanlife.

Regid self control, innerpurity of mind, renunciation of narrow egoistic motives, universal and catholic out look in life, and dispassionate guest of truth are the indispensable pre-requisites of philosophical knowledge. Philosophical presuit is not more idle theorizing. It is intensely practical, but not pragmatic. It aims at realization of the highest attainable perfection.

**The Schools of India Philosophy**

The nine systems of Indian Philosophical thought have been conventionally classified into two broad divisions of the orthodox (astika) and the heterodox (nastika). This classification has been made on the basis of whether or not a system believes in the infallibility of Vedas. The Schools that neither consider the Vedas to neither be infallible nor derive their own validity from the authority of the Vedas are classified as heterodox, or nastika. The schools of materialism, Buddhism, and Jainism, fall in this category as they repudiated the authority of the Vedas. The Buddhists and the Jainas subscribed to their own respective scriptures. The remaining six Schools are all orthodox because, directly or indirectly, they accept the authority of the Vedas. Of these, Mīmāṃsa and Vedanta depend entirely on the Vedas and exist in continuation of the Vedic tradition. Mimamsa emphasizes the importance of the rituals prescribed in the Vedas, but Vedanta considers the parts of Vedas which contain philosophical isuues.
more important. While Sāmkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaisesika are not based on the Vedas, but they accept the authority of the Vedas. They nevertheless are careful to maintain a consonance between their theories and the Vedas. This classification can be summed up in the following way.

Indian Philosophical Schools

Heterdox or Nāstika Schools
(Schools that reject the authority of the Vedas), Viz., the Materialism, the Jainism and the Buddhism

Orthodox or Āstika Schools
(Schools that do not reject the authority of the Vedas) - Nyāya, Vaiśesika, Sāmkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsa and Uttrārāmīmāṃsa

Let us now discuss each of these schools of Indian Philosophy briefly

1) Materialism: This School is also called the Cārvaka System, so named after its chief exponent, or Lokāyata, i.e., Philosophy of the people. As the name itself suggests, this school believes matter to be the only reality. The materialists accept the existence of only four eternal elements - earth, water, fire and air. They reduce everything to matter and explain even metaphysical concepts like consciousness as a property, which is produced in the body from a combination of these four elements in a certain proportion. Their whole philosophy rests on their theory of knowledge, which admits perception as the only source of valid knowledge. Consequently, they do not entertain the ideas of God, Soul, ākāśa, and the like, as these cannot be ascertained by perception. The Carvaka ethics leave a lot to be desired. Since they take this world to be the only reality, never to be experienced again once we die, they believe in maximum indulgence of senses. Out of the four human values - Dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣha - they advocate pursuit of kama only and artha merely as a facilitating means for the purpose. No original work of the system has survived.

2) Jainism: This schools can be qualified by adjectives like realistic, relativistic, pluralistic, and atheistic, Jaina believe in the validity of perception, inference, and testimony as means of knowledge. They camp up with a unique position of Syādāvāda, or the theory of relativity of knowledge. They believe that reality has innumerable aspects. Human knowledge is finite and cannot comprehend them all. Therefore, our judgements can never be absolutely affirmative or negative but only relative, i.e., as viewed from a particular viewpoint out of the infinite possible ones. Related to this doctrine is their theory of Anekāntavāda, i.e., the theory of manyness of reality, which asserted that reality is neither absolutely permanent nor constantly changing. It is permanent with respect to substance since matter
exists forever, but qualities are its accidental features, which come into being and perish. The Jaina metaphysics is pluralistic and divides all substances into souls (Jiva) and non-soul (ajiva), and both are separately and independently real.

3) Buddhism: This School came into being as a result of the enlightenment attained by Buddha, consequent to which he took to preaching. Although he preached orally, his three central doctrines have been preserved well. The first of these The four Noble Truths, Which are that there is misery, that there is a cause of misery, that there is cessation of misery, and that there is a path leading to the cessation of misery. The second doctrine is that of Pratityasamutpada or dependent origination, which is contained in the second and third noble truths. It says that everything in this world arises depending on the cause and is, therefore, impermanent. Buddha believed that suffering can break this cycle and liberate us. The theory contained in the fourth noble truth is called the Eight-fold Noble Path and prescribes the following eight steps, which lead to enlightenment. Buddhism believes in perception and inference as the means of valid knowledge. It also believes in testimony, but reduces it to inference. Buddha recommended avoiding extremes and following the middle path, which leads to knowledge, enlightenment, and, consequently, nirvana or liberation.

4) Nyāya: This School, which is said to have been founded by Gotama, is an allied system of Vaiśesika. The two share many of their views while differing on a few. Vaiśeṣika, which is devoted primarily to metaphysics and ontology, found its epistemological and logical counterpart in Nyaya. Nyāya subscribes to atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It asserts that there is suffering because the soul is in bondage due to ignorance of reality. The only way to end this suffering is by attaining liberation through knowledge. Therefore, Nyāya undertakes to establish the right ways of knowing.

5) Vaiśesika: Said to have been founded by Kaṇḍa, this school shares most of its ideas with Nyāya. Considering how important the right knowledge of reality is for liberation, Vaiśeṣika devotes itself to the exposition of reality. It classifies all realms under the seven categories of substance. Vaiśesika accepts only perception and inference as valid independent pramanas, and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to inference. Its views on causation, God, and liberation concur with that of Nyāya.

6) Sāmkhya: This School of dualistic realism was founded by Kapila. It believes in the existence of two mutually independent ultimate realities, viz. Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The essentially conscious puruṣa is intelligent. It is the self, which is other than the body, the senses, and the mind. It is a witness to the change going on in the world, but is itself eternal and not subject to change. Puruṣa is that who enjoys the products of prakṛti. Sāmkhya advocates the multiplicity of Puruṣa. Prakṛti, on the other hand, is unconscious and eternal, It is the first principle of the world. It is always changing and is meant to be enjoyed by the Puruṣa. It is constituted of the three gunas of sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are held in perfect equilibrium at the beginning of evolution. They consider earthly life as painful and liberation as
cessation of all pain. Knowledge of distinction between the self and the not-self does not itself liberate us, but sends us on the path of liberation, which is achieved through the spiritual training gained by the practice of Yoga.

7) Yoga: This School, which was founded by Patañjali, was closely allied with Śāmkhya, and accepts its epistemology and metaphysics. While Śāmkhya is theoretical, Yoga is practical, and they are both considered as two sides of the same system. Discriminative knowledge, or vevekajñān, is necessary for liberation and it can be attained through the practice of Yoga. The Practice of Yoga as a discipline had been done since ancient times. However, since its alliance with the Śāmkhya, it tried to develop a specific philosophy of its own, which would be in harmony with the Sankhya Philosophy. Though the popular understanding of Yoga equates it with just the asanas, there are eight steps prescribed for its practice, which emphasize internal and external cleansing, self-discipline physical fitness, and meditation, which result in alertness and mental strength.

8) Mīmāṃsa: The main aim of this School, which was founded by Jaimini, was to provide reasons in defence and favour of the ritualism prescribed by the Vedas. Their entire epistemology and metaphysics is formed to support this aim. In keeping with this objective, they contend that the Vedas are self-existing and eternal. They have not been written by any human. Therefore, they are free of error and we should submit to their authority without questions. The authority of Vedas prevails over everything else. They claim that the rituals mentioned in the Vedas when performed in a disinterested way destroy the karmas and lead to liberation after death. They assert that the world has always been like this. Apart from the reality of the physical world, they also insist on the reality of the souls. The soul is considered to be immortal because how else would they explain the performance of certain rituals, which are supposed to help attain heaven. The Prabhākara School accepts the validity of perception, inference, comparison, testimony, and postulation. The Kumārila school adds non-cognition to this list of pramanās. There is no place for God in the Mīmāṃsaka philosophy. There is a shift from their idea of liberation as attainment of bliss to liberation as cessation of suffering.

9) Vedanta: This School took its name from the fact that philosophically it was a continuation of the Vedas. The word ‘Vedanta’ is a composite of two words ‘Veda’ and ‘anta’, or end, and literally mens ‘the end of Vedas.’ The philosophy of this school arose from where the Vedas ended, i.e., from the Upaniṣhads. The other important sources on which the Vedantins depend are the Gitā and the Brahma-sūtra, which was the first work to successfully capture the essence of the Upaniṣhads in entirety. Śrī Śāmkara’s interpretation of is considered to be the most powerful one, and his philosophy of Advaitavada is considered to be the representative of the Vedanta Philosophy. Vedanta believes in monism and its metaphysics is in accordance with this principle. They do not consider the world to be ultimately real. They believe, like Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas, in six means of valid knowledge, viz. Perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non-cognition.

All the Schools of Indian Philosophy developed not in isolation from one another, but as interrelated to each other. Each had to defend its theory from the criticisms it faced from the other Schools and also develop its own theory to challenge the others. The development of a particular school cannot, therefore, be understood properly without constant reference to other Schools in which it finds a mention.
Sāmkhya Philosophy

Sāmkhya is undoubtedly one of the oldest systems of Indian Philosophy. It occupies a unique place among the six systems of Indian Philosophy. Its antiquity appears from the fact that the Sāmkhya tendency of thought pervades all the literature of ancient India including the Śrutis, Smṛtis and Purāṇas. This system is some times, described as the 'ateistic Sāmkhya' as distinguished from Yoga Philosophy, which is called 'theistic Sāmkhya'.

Tradition regards Kapila as the founder of this System. Iśwarakṛṣṇa, the author of Sāmkhyakārika speaks of kapila, Āsuri, and Pāṇchashika as earlier āchāryas of this systems. Kapika certainly flourished before Buddha and he must have composed Sāmkhya-Sūtra, which was unfortunately lost long ago. Iśwarakṛṣṇa’s Sāmkhyakārika seems to be the earliest available and the most popular work of this system. Beside the we have Guadapāda's SāmkhyaKārikabhāṣya, Vāchaspati Misra's SāmkhyaTattva-kaumudi and Vijñānabikṣhu's Sāmkhyapraṇavachanabhāṣya.

The Word Sāmkhya is derived from the word 'Saṅkhya' which means right knowledge as well as number. The Bhagavadgītā used the word in the sense of knowledge. Sāmkhya means the philosophy of right knowledge (Sānyakhyāti or jñāna). The System is prodomently intellectual and theoretical. Right knowledge is the knowledge if the separation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti. Yoga as the counterpart of Sāmkhya, means action or practice and tells us how the theoretical metaphysical teachings of Sāmkhya might be realized in actual practice. Thus Sāmkhya - Yoga form one complete system, the former being the theoretical while the letter being the practical aspect of the same teaching. Sāmkhya is also the philosophy of the numbers, because it deals with twenty five categories. Sāmkhya maintains a clear-cut dualism between puruṣa and prakṛti and further maintains the plurality of Puruṣhas, and is silent on God. It is a pluralistic spiritualism and an atheistic realism and uncompromising dualism.

Theory of Causation - Satkarya Vāda

The Sāmkhya theory of causation is 'Parināma Vāda'. The Sāmkhya system believes is Satkārya Vāda, that the effects is not a new creation, it pre-exist in its material cause. The effect is only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause. According to Sāmkhya theory the effect is a real transformation of its cause and it is called Pariṇāma Vāda. (Pariṇāma - Real Modification). The view of Sāmkhya - Yoga is called Prakṛtipariṇāma Vāda.
Sāmkhya believes in Satkāravyāda. All the material effects are the modifications (pariṇāma) of Prakṛti. They pre-exist in the eternal bosom of Prakṛti and simply come out of it at the time of creation and return to it at the time of dissolution. There is neither new production nor utter destruction. Production means development or manifestation (āvirbhāva); destruction means enveopment or dissolution (tirobhāva). Production is evolution; destruction is involution. Sāmkhya gives five agreements in support of Satkāravyāda.

1. If the effect does not pre-exist in its cause, it becomes a mere nonentity like the hare's horn or the sky-flower and can never be produced (Asadakarṇāt).

2. The effect is only a manifestation of its material cause, because it is invariably connected with it (Upādābegrhāṇāt).

3. Everything cannot be produced out of everything. This suggests that the effect, before its manifestation, is implicit in its material cause (Sarvasambhavābhāvāt).

4. Only an efficient cause can produce that for which it is potent. This again means that the effect, before its manifestation, is potentially contained in its material cause. Production is only an actualization of the potential (Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt). Were is not so, then curd should be produced out of water, and cloth out of reeds, and oil out of sand-particles.

5. The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. When the obstructions in the way of manifestation are removed, the effect naturally flows out of its cause. The cause and the effect are the implicit and the explicit stages of the same process. The cloth is contained in the threads, the oil in the oil-seeds, the curd in the milk. The effect pre-exists in its material cause (Kāraṇabhāvāt).

Prakṛti

The theory that causation means a real transformation of the material cause leads to the concept of Prakṛti as the root-cause of the world of objects. All worldly effects are latent in this uncaused cause, because infinite regress has to be avoided. It is the potentiality of nature, 'the receptacle and nurse of all generation'. As the uncaused root-cause, it is called Prakṛti; as the first principle of this Universe, it is called Pradhāna; as the unmanifested state of all effects it is know as Avyakta; as the extremely subtle and imperceptible thing which is only inferred from its products, it is called Anumāna; as the unintelligent and unconscious principle, it is called Jaśa; and as the ever-active unlimited power, it is called Śakti. The products are caused, dependent, relative, many and temporary as they are subject to birth and death or to production and destruction; but Prakṛti is uncaused, independent, absolute, one and eternal, being beyond production and destruction. Prakṛti alone is the final source of this world of objects which is implicitly and potentially contained in its bosom. Sāmkhya gives five proofs for the existence of Prakṛti which are as follows:
1. All individual things in this world are limited, dependent, conditional and finite. The Finite cannot be the cause of the universe. Logically we have to proceed from the finite to the infinite, from the limited to the unlimited, from the peros the aperos, from the temporary to the permanent, from the many to the one. And it is this infinite, unlimited, eternal and all pervading Prakṛti which is the source of this universe (Bhedānām parimāṇat).

2. All worldly things possess certain common characteristics by which they are capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence there must be a common source composed of three Guṇas, from which all worldly things arise (Samanvayāt).

3. All effects arise from the activity of the potent cause. Evolution means the manifestation of the hitherto implicit as the explicit. The activity which generates evolution must be inherent in the world - cause. And this cause is Prakṛti (Kāryataḥ Pravṛttescha).

4. The effect differs from the cause and hence the limited effect cannot be regarded as its own cause. The effect is the explicit and the cause is the implicit state of the same process. The effects, therefore, point to a world-cause where they are potentially contained (Kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt).

5. The unity of the universe points to a single cause. And this cause is Prakṛti. (Avibhāgāt vaishvarūpyasya.

Prakṛi is said to be the unity of the three Guṇas held in equilibrium (guṇānām sāmyāvasthā). The three Guṇas are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. When these guṇas are held in a state of equilibrium, that state is called Prakṛti. Evolution of worldly objects does not take place at this state. These guṇas are said to be ever - changing, They cannot remain static even for a moment. Change is said to be of two kinds - homogeneous or Sarūpa-parināma and heterogeneous or Virūpa-parināma. During the state of dissolution (praṇaya) of the world, the guṇas change homogeneously, i.e., sattva changes into sattva, rajas into rajas and tamas into tamas. This change does not disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas and unless the equilibrium is disturbed and one predominates over the other two, evolution cannot take place. Evolution starts when there is heterogeneous change in the guṇas and one predominates over the other two and brings about terrific commotion in the bosom of Prakṛi.

The Evolutes

The first product of the evolution is called Mahat, the great. It is the germ of this vast world of objects including intellect, ego and mind. It is cosmic in its nature. But it has a psychological aspect also in which it is called buddhi or intellect. Buddhi is distinguished from consciousness. Puruṣa alone is pure consciousness. Buddhi or intellect, being the evolute of Prakṛti, is material. Its functions are said to be ascertainment and decision. It arises when sattva predominates. Its original attributes are virtue (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), detachment (vairāgya) and power (aishvarya). When it gets vitiated by tamas these attributes are replaced by their opposites. Memories and recollections are stored in buddhi.
Mahat produces Ahaṅkāra. It is the principle of individuation. Its functions is to generate self sense (abhimāna). It produces the notion of the 'I' and the 'mine'. It is the individual ego - sense. Puruṣa wrongly identifies himself with this ego and knows himself as the agent of actions, desirer of desires and striver for ends, and possessor and enjoyer of ideas, emotions and volitions and also of material objects. Ahaṅkāra is said to be of three kinds:

1. Vaikārika or sattvika, when sattva predominates.
2. Bhūtādi or tāmasa, when tāmasa predominates.
3. Taijasa or rājas, when rājas predominates.

Manas or mind which arises from the Sattvika Ahaṅkāra is the subtle and central sense - organ. It can come into contact with the several sense - organs at the same time. The Sattvika Ahaṅkāra produces, besides manas, the five sensory and the five motor organs. The five sensory organs (jñānendriya) are the function of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound. Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra and manas represent the three psychological aspects of knowing, willing and feeling or cognition, conation and affection respectively. Sāmkhya calls them material and derives them from Prakṛti. From the Tāmasa Ahaṅkāra arise the five subtle essences which are called Tanmātras or 'things -in-themselves'. These are the essences of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound. From these tanmāntrās five Mahābhutas of earth, water, fire, air and ether are produced. Evolution is the play of these twenty - four principles which, together with the Puruṣa who is a mere spectator and outside the play of evolution, are the twenty-five categories of Sāmkhya. Out of these twenty-five principles, the Puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect; Mahat, Ahaṅkāra and the five subtle essences are both causes and effects; while the five sensory and the five motor organs and the five gross elements and manas are effects only. This may be depicted by the following table:
Puruṣa

The other of the two co-present co-eternal realities of Sāṃkhya is the Puruṣa, the Principal of pure consciousness. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. It is neither body nor senses nor brain nor mind (manas) nor ego (ahaṅkāra) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses the quality of Consciousness. Consciousness is the essence. It is itself pure and transcendental Consciousness. It is ultimate knower which is the foundation of all knowledge. It is the pure subject and as such can never become and object of knowledge. It is the silent witness, the emancipated alone, the neutral seer, the peaceful eternal. It is beyond time and space, beyond change and activity. It is self-luminous and self-proved. It is uncaused, eternal and all pervading. It is the indubitable real, the postulate of knowledge, and all doubles and denials presuppose its existence. It is called nistraiguṇya, udāsinā, akartā, kevela, madhyastha, Śākṣi, draṣṭā, sadāprakāśhasvarūpa, and Jñāta.

The Sāṃkhya believes in the plurality of the Puruṣas. The selves are all essentially alike; only numerically are they different. Their essence is consciousness. Bliss is regarded as different form consciousness. Bliss is regarded as different form consciousness and is the product of the sattvaguṇa.

Proofs for the existence of Puruṣa

Sāṃkhya gives the following Proofs for the existence of the Puruṣa:

1. All compound objects exist for the sake of the Puruṣa. The body, the senses, the mind and the intellect are all means to realize to end of the Puruṣa. The three guṇas, the Prakṛti, the subtle body - all are said to serve the purpose of the self. Evolution is teleological or purposive. Prakṛti evolves itself in order to serve the Puruṣa's end. This proof is teleological (Saṅghātaparārthatvāt).

2. All objects are composed of the three guṇas and therefore logically presuppose the existence of the Puruṣa who is the witness of these guṇas and is himself beyond them. The three guṇas imply the conception of a nistraiguṇya - that which is beyond them. This proof is logical (Triguṇādīviparyayāt).

3. There must be a transcendental synthetic unity of pure Consciousness to coordinate all experience. All knowledge necessarily presupposes the existence of the self. The self is the foundation (Adhiṣṭhānāt).

4. Non-intelligent Prakṛti cannot experience its products. So there must be an intelligent principle to experience the worldly products of Prakṛti. Prakṛti is the enjoyed (bhogyā) and so there must be an enjoyer (bhoktā), i.e., Puruṣa (bhokṭbhāvāt)

5. There are persons who toy to attain release from the sufferings of the world/ The desire for liberation implies the existence of a person who can try for liberation. (Kaivalyārtham Pravṛtteḥ)

Proofs for the plurality of Puruṣa

Sāṃkhya gives the following three arguments for proving the plurality of the Puruṣas:
1. The souls have different sensory and motor organs and undergo separate births and deaths. Had there been only one Puruṣa, the birth or death of one should have meant the birth or death of all and any particular experience of pleasure, pain or indifference by one should have been equally shared by all. Hence the souls must be many.

2. If the self were one, bondange of the should have meant bondage of all and the liberation of one should have meant the liberation of all. The activity of one should have made all persons active and the sleep of one should have lulled into sleep all other persons.

3. Though the emancipated souls are all like and differ only in number as they are all beyond the three guṇas, yet the bound souls relatively differ in qualities also, since in some sattva predominates, while in others rajas, and in still others tamas. Hence their difference.

**Puruṣa and Prakṛti**

The evolution is teleological, Everything works to serve the purpose of the Puruṣa though unconsciously. Just as non-intelligent trees grow fruits, or water flows on account of the declivity of the soil, or ironfilings are attracted towards a magnet, or mils flows through the udders of the cow in order to nourish the calf, similarly everything unconsciously tends to serve the purpose of the Puruṣa, whether it is enjoyment or liberation. Prakṛti is the benefactress of Puruṣa. Though Puruṣa is inactive and indifferent and devoid of qualities, yet the virtuous and the generous Prakṛti which is full of qualities and goodness ceaselessly works through various means in a spirit of detachment for the realization of the Puruṣa, without any benefit to herself. Prakṛti works to liberate the Puruṣa. There is immanent teleology in Prakṛti. Though Puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect, yet relatively it is he who should be regarded as the efficient cause as well as the final cause of evolution though Sāmkhya regards Prakṛti as both the material and the efficient cause. He is the unmoved mover who is beyond evolution. He is the end towards which the creation moves. And the creation moves by His mere presence. The guṇas, which mutually differ and yet always co-operate, work like the oil, wick and flame of a lamp and illuminate the entire purpose of the Puruṣa and present it to the buddhi or the intellect. All the organs work for the realization of the of the Puruṣa's end and for no other end. The subtle body too works for the sake of the Puruṣa's end. Thus the whole creation unconsciously tends towards the realization of the purpose of the Puruṣa. And creation will continue till all the Puruṣas are liberated. The entire evolution of Prakṛti, therefore, right from the first evolute, the Mahat, up to the last evolutes, the gross elements, is for the purpose of liberating each individuals Puruṣa.

**Bondage and liberation**

The earthly life is full of three kinds of pain. The first kind, called ādhyātmika, is due to intraorganic psychophysical causes and includes, all mental and bodily sufferings. The second, ādhibhautika, is due to extra - organic natural causes like men, bastes, birds, thorns etc. The third, ādhidaivika, is due to supernatural causes like the planets, elemental agencies, ghosts, demons etc. Wherever there are guṇas...
there are pains. Even the so-called pleasures lead to pain. Even the life in heaven is subject to the guṇas. The end of man is to get rid of these kinds of pain and sufferings. Liberation means complete cassation of all sufferings which is the summum bonum, the highest end of life (Apavarga or Puruṣārtha.)

Puruṣa is free and pure consciousness. It is inactive, indifferent and possesses no attributes. Really speaking, it is above time and space, merit and demerit, bondage and liberation. It is only when it mistakes its reflection in the buddhi for itself and identifies itself wrongly with the internal organ the intellect, the ego and the mind, that it is said to be bound. It is the ego, and not the Puruṣa, which is bound. When the Puruṣa realizes its own pure nature it gets liberated which in fact it always was. Hence bondage is due to ignorance or non-discrimination between the self and the not-self. Liberation cannot be obtained by means of actions. Karma, good or bad or indifferent, is the function of the guṇas and leads to bondage and not to liberation. Good actions may lead to heaven and bad actions to hell but heaven and hell alike, like this worldly life, are subject to pain. It is only knowledge which leads to liberation because bondage is due to ignorance and ignorance can be removed only by knowledge.

Sāmkhya admits both Jīvanmukti and Vedehamukti. The moment right knowledge dawns, the person becomes liberated here and now, even though he may be embodied due to prarabdha Karma.

The final and the absolute emancipation, the complete disembodied isolation automatically results after death. Sāmkhya liberation is a state of complete isolation, freedom from all pain, a return of the Puruṣa to its pure nature as consciousness. There is no pleasure or happiness or bliss here, for pleasure presupposes pain and is relative to it. Pleasure is the result of sattva guṇa and liberation transcends all guṇas.

Sāmkhya believes that bondage and liberation alike are only phenomenal. The bondage of the Puruṣa is a fiction. It is only the ego, the product of Prakṛti, which is bound. And consequently it is only the ego which is liberated. Puruṣa, in its complete isolation, is untouched by bondage and liberation. If Puruṣa were really bound, it could not have obtained liberation even after hundred births, for real bondage can be destroyed. It is Prakṛti which is bound and Prakṛti which is liberated.

God

The Original Sāmkyha was monistic and theistic. But the classical Sāmkhya, perhaps under the influence of Materialism, Jainism and Early Buddhism, became atheistic. It is orthodox because it believes in the authority of the Veda. It does not establish the non-existence of God. It only shows that Prakṛti and Puriṣas are sufficient to explain this universe and therefore there is no reason for postulating a hypothesis of God. But some commentators have tried to repudiate the existence of God, while the later Sāmkhya writers like Vijñānabhikṣu have tried to revive the necessity for admitting God. Those Who repudiate the existence of God give the following arguments: if God is affected by selfish motives, He is not free; if He is free, He will not create this world of pain and misery. Either God is unjust and cruel or He is not...
free and all-powerful. If he is determined by the law of Karma, He is not free; if not, He is a tyrant. Again, God being pure knowledge, this material world cannot spring from Him. The effects are implicitly contained in their cause and the material world which is subject to change requires and unintelligent and ever-changing cause and not a spiritual and immutable God. Again, the eternal existence of the Puruṣas is inconsistent with God. If they are the parts of God, they must have some divine power. If they are created by God, they are subject to destruction. Hence there is no God.

Yoga Philosophy

Patañjali is the traditional founder of the Yoga System and is regarded as the compliment of Sāmkhya. The word 'Yoga' literally means 'Union', i.e. spiritual union of the Individual soul with the universal soul and is used in this sense in the Vedanta. The Bhagavadgītā defines Yoga as that state than with there is nothing higher or worth realizing and firmly rooted in which a person is never shaken even by the greatest pain; that state free from all pain and misery is yoga. According to Patañjāli, Yoga does not mean union, but spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of the body, senses and mind, and through right discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

Yoga is intimately allied to Sāmkhya. Yoga means spiritual action and Sāmkhya means knowledge. Sāmkhya is theory; Yoga is practice. For all practical purposes, Sāmkhya and Yoga may be treated as the theoretical and the practical sides of the same system. Yoga mostly accepts the metaphysics and the epistemology of Sāmkhya. It shows the practical path by following with one may attain Viveka - Jñāna which alone leads to liberation. Yoga accepts three pramāṇas - Perception (प्रत्यय), inference (अनुमान) and testimony (मान्य) of Sāmkhya and also the twenty-five metaphysical principles. Yoga believes in God as the highest self distinct from other selves. Hence it is sometimes called 'theistic Sāmkhya' or 'theistic Sāmkhya' as distinct from classical Sāmkhya which is nirśwara or atheistic.

The Yoga Sutra of Patañjali is the first authoritative text in this system and is divided into four parts. The first is called Samādhi Pāda which deals with the nature and aim of concentration. The Second, Śādhanāpāda, explains the means to realize this end. The third, Vibhūtipāda deals with the supra-normal powers which can be acquired through Yoga. The forth, Kaivalya pāda, describes the nature of liberation and the reality of the transcendental self. The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali were believed to have been written in the second century B.C. A commentary of this text was prepared by Vyāsa, and later on was followed by a number of learned interpretations of it, all of which help to explain the Yogic Philosophy.

Psychology of Yoga

The Path of Yoga is based on sound psychological foundation. Hence to appreciate this path, the psychology of Yoga must first be understood. The most important element in the psychology of Yoga is Chitta. Chitta is the first modification of Prakriti in which there is the predominance of Sattva over rajas and tamas. It is material by nature, but due to the closest contact with the self it is enlightened by its light.
It assumes the form of anything in whose contact it comes. Due to the modifications of the Chitta according to objects, the self knows these objects. According to YogaSūtra, though there is no modification in the self, except as the reflection of the changing Chitta Vriattis (modifications of Chitta), there is an appearance of change in it, just as the moon reflected in the river seems to be moving. When true knowledge is attained, the self ceases to see itself in these modifications of the Chitta and gets rid of attachment and aversion to the worldly pleasures and sufferings. This attachment and aversion is bondage. The only way to get rid of this bondage is to control the modification of the chitta. This control is the result of Yoga. In the words of Patanjali, "Yoga is the cessation of the modification of Chitta. (Yogah Chittavrittinirodhaḥ)

Stages of Chitta

Chitta has five stages which are known as Chittabhumi. These five stage are as follows:

1. Kṣipta. This is the stage in which the chitta is very much disturbed and remains loitering after the worldly objects.

2. Mūdha. When there is preponderance of tamas, just as when one is over-powered by sleep, the stage of the chitta is known as Mudha,

3. Vikṣipta. This is the state in which inspite of preponderance of the sattva guṇa, the chitta is oscillating between the tendencies of success and failures created by the rajas. The Chitta of the gods and that of beginners in yoga is of this sort. This differs from the Kshipa stage because due to the preponderance of sattva sometimes there is temporary ceasing of the modifications of the chitta in this stage.

4. Ėkāgra. The stage of the chitta when it is fixed on some one subject due to the preponderance of the sattva is known as the ekagra stage, just as the flame of the burning lamp remains always pointing to one side and does not flicker hither and thither.

5. Niruddha. When only the impressions remain in chitta after the cessation of the modifications, the stage is known as the niruddha stage. It is this stage which is known as Yoga.

Of the above -mentioned five stages, the first three are harmful in Yoga and may be removed by practice. The last two stages are useful in Yoga.

Forms of Chitta

Because chitta is of the nature of three gunas, it always remains changing due to the preponderance of one or the other of the guṇas. With this preponderance, three main forms of Chitta can be noticed which are under.

1. Prakhyā. In this stage, the chitta is predominated by sattva guna and tamas remain in subordination. In this form, the chitta aspires for different powers of Yoga, e.g., anima, etc.
2. Pravṛtti. When the tamas becomes weak, and the chitta is predominated by the rajas, it appears to be enlightened and full of dharma, knowledge renunciation, etc.

3. Sthiti. As the rajas is subordinated, the chitta, predominated by the sattva element, gets established in its own form and attains the discriminating reason. This form of the chitta is known as sthiti.

**Modifications of Chitta**

As has already been pointed out, the Chitta, in spite of its being material, seems to be a living entity due to the reflection of the self in it. It is these changes in the chitta which are known as its Vṛūtis or modifications. These modifications are due to ignorance and their result is bondage. These modifications are of five types which are as follows:

1. Pramāṇa. (Right cognition) Like Samkhya philosophy, Yoga has also accepted three Pramāṇas, of perception, inference and testimony. By going outside through the sensation, the Chitta attains the form of object. This is known as pramāṇa.

2. Viparyaya. (Wrong cognition) The false knowledge of anything is known as viparyaya. Vachaspati Mishra has included doubt (Samsaya) also in viparyaya.

3. Vikalpa. (Verbal cognition or imagination) This is knowledge in which the object which is known does not exist, e.g., in the knowledge that consciousness is the form of the Purusa, a distinction is made between the consciousness and the Puruṣa which actually does not exist. The conception of the two as distinct is vikalpa.

4. Nidra. (Absence of cognition or sleep) The modification of the chitta which is the substratum of the knowledge of absence of anything is known as nidra or sleep. Due to the preponderance of tamas in its vṛūti, there is absolute absence of the waking and dreaming modifications. But this stage should not be conceived as the total absence of knowledge because after arising from sleep the person has the consciousness that he had slept well. Hence sleep is also a modification.

5. Smriti. (Memory) Smriti or memory is the remembering of the experience. The above-mentioned modifications cause samskaras or predispositions in the inner instrument i.e., Chitta and due course these predispositions again take the form of modifications. Thus, the cycle goes on for ever.

According to Yoga Philosophy, there are several causes of disturbance (vikṣepa) in the chitta. These are: Disease, inactivity, doubt, carelessness, attachment with object, false knowledge, non-attainment of the stage of samadhi, absence of concentration, etc.

The Yoga prescribes the practice of concentration to check the above-mentioned causes of the distraction of chitta. Together with concentration, there should be friendliness towards living beings, sympathy towards sufferers, aversion towards evil doers and pleasant attitude towards the good persons.
Kinds of Kleśas

Avidya or ignorance breeds false knowledge and false knowledge breeds klesas. These are of five types:

1. **Avidya.** (ignorance) The seeing of self which is eternal and pure in non-eternal, impure and painful not-self is avidya or ignorance.

2. **Asmita.** (egoism) Asmita is the false conception of identity between purusa and Prakriti and the absence of distinction between them.

3. **Rāga.** (attachment) Rāga is the acute thirsting for worldly pleasures.

4. **Dvēṣa.** (avarice) Dvēṣa is anger in the means of suffering.

5. **Abhiniveśa.** Abhiniveśa is fear of death.

Eighfold Path of Yoga

Yoga advocates control over the body, the senses and the mind. It does not want to kill the body; on the other, it recommends it perfection. A sound mind needs a sound body. Sensual attachment and passions distract the body as well as the mind. They must be conquered. To overcome them, Yoga gives us the Eightfold path of Discipline (Aṣṭāṅga Yoga):

1) **Yama:** It means abstention and includes the five vows of Jainism. It is abstention from injury through through, word or deed (ahimsā), from falsehood (satya), from stealing (asteya), from passions and lust (brahmacharya), and from avarice (apargraha).

2) **Niyama:** It is self-culture and includes external and internal purification (shaucha), contentment (santoṣa), austerity (tapas), study (Svādhyāya) and devotion to God (Īshvarapraṇidhāna)/

3) **Āsana:** It means steady and comfortable posture. There are various kinds of postures which are a physical help to meditation. This is the discipline of the body.

4) **Prāṇāyāma:** It means control of breath and deals with regulation of inhalation, retention and exhalation of breath. It is beneficial to health and is highly conducive to the concentration of the mind. But it must be performed under expert guidance otherwise it may have bad aftereffects.

5) **Prathāhāra:** It is control of the senses and consists in with drawing the senses from their objects. Our senses have a natural tendency to go to outward objects. They must be checked and directed towards the internal goal. It is the process of introversion.

These five are called internal aids to Yoga (bahiraṅga sādhana), while the remaining three which follow are called internal aids (antaraṅga Sādhana).

6) **Dhāraṇā:** It is fixing the mind on the object of meditation like the tip of the nose or the midpoint of the eyebrows or the lotus of the heart or the image of the deity. The mind must be steadfast like the inflickering flame of a lamp.
7) **Dhyāna:** It means meditation and consists in the undisturbed flow of thought round the object of meditation (pratyayaikatānatā). It is steadfast contemplation without any break.

8) **Samādhi:** It means concentration. This is the final step in Yoga. Here the mind is completely absorbed in the object of meditation. In dhyāna the act of meditation and the object of meditation remain separate. But here they become one. It is the highest means to realize the cessation of mental modifications which is the end. It is the ecstatic state in which the connection with the external world is broken and through which one has to pass before obtaining liberation.

Samādhi is of two kinds: Conscious or Samprajñāta and supraconscious or Asamprajñāta. In the former consciousness of the object of meditation persists, in the latter it is transcended. The former is Ekāgra, the latter is Niruddha. In the former the mind remains concentrated on the object of meditation. The meditator and the object of meditation are fused together, yet the consciousness of the object of meditation persists. This state is said to be of four kinds:

a) Savitarka: When the Chitta is concentrated on a gross object of meditation like the tip of the nose or the mind-point of the eyebrows or the image of the deity.

b) Savichāra: When the Chitta is concentrated on a subtler object of meditation like the tanmātrās.

c) Sānanda : When the Chitta concentrated on a still subtler object of meditation which produces joy, like the senses.

d) Sāsmitā : When the Chitta is concentrated on the egosubstance with which the self is generally identified. Here we have conscious ecstasy where individuality persists.

Asamprajñāta Samādhi is that supra-conscious concentration where the meditator and the object of meditation are completely fused together and there is not even consciousness of the object of meditation. Here no new mental modifications arise. They are checked (niruddha), though the latent impressions may continue. It is is highest form of Yoga which is divine madness, perfect mystic ecstasy difficult to describe and more difficult to attain. Even those who attain in cannot retain it longer. Immediately or after very short time, the body breaks and they obtain complete liberation.

**Eight Siddhis**

According to Yoga Philosophy, the Yogis attain various siddhis by practising the path of Yoga. These powers are mainly of eight types and hence are called Aṣṭa Siddhis or Aṣṭa Aiśhwaryas.

1. **Aśima-** This is the power to become small like an atom and to be invisible.
2. **Laghima-** This is the power to become light like cotton and so to be able to fly away.
3. **Mahima-** This is the power to become big like mountains.
4. **Prāpti-** This is the power to secure whatever is desired
5. **Prākāmya**-This is the power by which all the impediments in the will power are removed.

6. **Vaśitva**-This is the power by which all the living beings may be conquered.

7. **Eśitva**-This is the power by which one attains absolute mastery over all the physical objects.

8. **Yatrakāmavaśāyitva**-This is the power by which all the desires are fulfilled.

The powers attained through the above-mentioned eight siddhis may be used according to the wish of the Yogi. But in the Yoga philosophy the pursuance of the path of Yoga for attainment of these powers has been vehemently decried because that results in deflecting the aspirant from the path of Yoga. The ultimate end of Yoga is not the attainment of these powers, but the realisation of liberation.

**God**

Yoga accepts the existence of God. The interest of Patañjali himself in God seems to be practical, but later Yogins have taken also a theoretical interest in him and have tried to prove His existence as necessary philosophical speculation. Patañjali defines God as special kind of Puruṣa, who is always free from pains, actions, effects and impressions - *Kleśakarmavipākāshayair aparāmṛṣṭah puruṣaviṣhesa Iśwarah* - says Yogasūtra. He is eternally free and was never bound nor has any possibility of being bound. He is above the law of Karma. He is omniscient and omnipotent and omnipresent. He is perfection incarnate. He is purest knowledge. He is the teacher of ṛṣis, and teacher of Veda. ‘Aum’ is his symbol. Devotion to God is one of the Surest means of obtaining concentration. He cannot grant liberation. He can only remove the obstacles in the upward progress of the devotees. Directly he has nothing to do with the bondage and the liberation of the Puruṣas. Ignorance binds the discrimination between prakṛti and Puruṣa liberates. The end of human life is not the union with God but only the separation of Puruṣa from Prakṛti.

**Nyāya Philosophy**

The sage Gotama is the founder of Nyāya School. He is also known as Akṣapāda. Nyāya means argumentation and suggests that the systems is predominantly intellectual, analytic, logical and epistemological. It is also called Tarkaśāstra or the Science of reasoning; Pramāṇaśāstra or the Science of logic and the epistemology; Hetuvidhya or the Science of Cause; Vādavidya or the Science of debating and Ānvikṣikī or the science of critical Study.

Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra was commented upon by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya Bhāṣya. On this Uddyotakara wrote his Vārtika which was commented upon by Vāchaspati in his Tātparya-ṭīkā. Udayanā's Nyāya Kusumānjali and Jayanta's Nyāya Manjari, Vāchaspati's Nyāyasudhi Nibandhah, Bhāsarvajñā's Nyāyasāra, etc. are the other important works of this school. The Navya-Nyāya or the modern School of Indian logic begins with the epoch-making Tattva-chintāmani of Gaṅgāsha. Vāsudeva, Raghunātha, Mathurānātha and Jagalisha and Gadādhara are the eminent logicians of this school.
Nyāya And Vaises̄ika

Nyāya is a system of atomic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaiśeṣika system which is regarded as 'Samānatantra' or Similar Philosophy. Vaiśeṣika develops metaphysics and ontology; Nyāya develops logic and epistemology. Both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering, as bondage of the soul and in regarding liberation which is absolute cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life. Both agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and that liberation is due to right knowledge of reality. Vaiśeṣika takes up the exposition of reality and Nyāya takes up the exposition of right knowledge of reality. Nyāya mostly accepts the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. But there are some important points of difference between them. The difference are in the case of the acceptance of the padārthas and Pramāṇas. Nyāya accepts three pramāṇas as valid means of knowledge (Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Sabdha). The Navya Nyāya acaryas like Udayana accepts four pramāṇas including Upamāna; while Vaiśeṣika accepts Pratyakṣa and Anumāna as pramāṇas.

Theory of knowledge

Knowledge, according to Nyāya, reveals both the subject and the object which are quite distinct from itself. This is the reason why Nyāya is called as realist system. Knowledge or cognition is defined as apprehension or consciousness. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge, is called pramāṇa and, is defined as the right apprehension of an object. Nyāya maintains the theory of correspondence (Paratah Pramāṇa.) Non - Valid knowledge is know as apramāṇa. Pramāṇa is valid means of knowledge. "(Pramāṇakaraṇam Pramāṇam - Pramāṇau yathārthajñānam.)" Nyāya accepts four valid means of knowledge namely, perception, inference, testimony and comparison.

Pratyakṣa

Gotama defines perception as 'non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well-defined'. "Indriyārthaśāntikaṁ janyam jñānaṁ or jñāṇaṁ Kāraṇakam Jñānam Pratyakṣam." This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. Hence Viśvanātha has defined perception as 'direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition'. This definition includes ordinary as well as extra -ordinary perception and excludes inference, comparison and testimony. Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense - organs, the objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contacts. The self comes into contact with the manas, the manas with the sense - organs and the sense-organs with the objects. The contact of the sense-organs with the objects is not possible unless the manas first comes into contact with the sense -organs, and the contact of the manas with the sense -organs is not possible unless the self comes into contact with the manas. Hence sense - object contact necessarily presupposes the manas - sense contact and the self - manas contact. The sense -organs are derived from the elements whose specific qualities of smell, taste,
colour, touch and sound are manifested by them. The manas is the mediator between the self and the sense-organs. The external object, through the senses and the manas, makes an impression on the self. The theory, therefore, is realistic.

**The Two Stages in Pratyakṣa (Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa Pratyakṣa)**

The Naiyāyika maintains two stages in perception. The first is called indeterminate or nirvikalpa and the second, determinate or savikalpa. They are not two different kinds of perception, but only the earlier and the later stages in the same complex process of perception. These two stages are recognized by Gotama in his definition of perception quoted above.

All perception is determinate, but is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Bare sensation or simple apprehension is nirvikalpa perception; perceptual judgement or relational apprehension is savikalpa perception. Perception is a complex indeterminate perception forms the material out of which determinate perception perception is shaped, but they can be distinguished only in thought and not divided in reality. Nirvikalpa perception is the immediate apprehension, the bare awareness, the direct sense-experience which is undifferentiated and non-relational and is free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis.

Indeterminate perception presents the bare object without any characterization. Indeterminate perception we relate the substance with its attributes. The feeling of indeterminate perception is psychological, but its knowledge is logical.

Vātsyāyana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception; if it is perceived without its name, we live indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct something and is devoid on any association with a name, while determinate perception apprehends all these together with a name. Gaṅgешa Upādhyāya defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object devoid of all association of name, genus, differential etc. Annam Bhaṭṭa defines it as the immediate apprehension of an object as well as of its qualities, 'but without the knowledge of the relation between them. The substance and the qualities, the 'that' and the 'What' are felt separately and it is not apprehended that those qualities inhere in that substance or that the 'what' characterizes the 'that'.

**The Two Kinds of Pratyakṣa (Luakika And Alaukika)**

Again, according to Nyāya, Pratyakṣa is of two kinds, namely, luakika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary). When the sense-organs come into contact with the object present to them in the usual way, we have Laukika Perception. And if the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is in an unusual way, i.e., if the objects are not ordinarily present to the senses but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary medium, we have Alaukika perception. Ordinary perception is of two kinds internal (māṇasa) and external (bāhya). In internal perception, the mind (manas) which is the internal organ
comes into contact with the psychical states and processes like cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. External perception takes place when the five external organs of sense organs of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively when they come into contact with the external object. The external sense-organce are composed of material elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether and therefore each sense the particular quality of its element. Thus the sense-organ of smell is composed of the atoms of earth and perceives smell which is the specific quality of earth and so on.

Extra - ordinary perception is of three kinds - sāmānyalakṣaṇa, Jñānalakṣaṇa and Yogaja. Sāmānyalakṣaṇ perception is the perception of the universals. The second kind of extraordinary perception is called Jñānalakṣaṇa perception. It is the 'Complicated' perception through association. Sometimes different sensations become associated and form one integrated perception. Here an object is not directly presented to a sense-organ, but is revived in memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation. The theory of illusion accepted by Nyāya called 'Anyathākhyyāti' is based on this kind of perception. The third kind of extra - ordinary perception is called Yogaja perception. This is the intuitive and immediate perception of all objects, past, present and future, possessed by the Yogins through the power of meditation. It is intuitive, supra - sensuous and supra - relational.

Anumāna

The second kind of knowledge is anumāna or inferential or relational and its means is called anumāna or inference. It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and arises through a 'mark', the 'middle term' (liṅga or hetu) which is invariably connected with the 'Major term' (Śādhya). Ut is knowledge (māna) which arises after (anu) other knowledge. "Parāmarsha janyam jñānam anumitih, Vyāptivusṭapakṣadharmatā jñānam parāmarshah." Invariable concomitance (vyāpti of avinābhāvaniyama) is the nerve of inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called pakṣadharmatā. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called vyāpti. The knowledge of pakṣadharmatā as qualified by vyāpti is called parāmarsha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor (pakṣadharmatā) and is invariably associated with the major (Vyāpti). The major, the minor and the middle are here called sādhya, pakṣa and liṅga or hetu respectively. We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire (Vyāpti) and if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Hill is the minor term; fire is the major term; smoke is the middle term.

Indian logic does not separate deduction from induction. Inference is a complex process involving both. Inference is divided into svārtha (for oneself) and parārtha (for other). In the former we do not require the formal statement of the different members of inference. It is a psychological process. The latter, the parārtha which is a syllogism, has to be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince other. There are five members in the Nyāya syllogism. The first is called Pratijñā or proposition. It is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is Hetu or 'reason' which states the reason for
the establishment of the proposition. The third is called Udāharaṇa which gives the universal concomitance to the present case. And the fifth is Nigamana or conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five propositions of the Indian Syllogism are called 'Members' or avayavas. The followings is a typical Nyāya Syllogism.

1. This hill has fire (Pratijñā) (Parvatōvahnimān)
2. Because it has smoke (hetu) (Dhūmāt)
3. Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., an oven (udāharaṇa) (Yatra Yatradhoomah, tatra tatra vahnih)
4. This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire (upanaya) (Tathā chaasau)
5. Therefore this hill has fire (nigamana) (Tasmāt tathā)

Vyāpti- Vyāpti implies a correlation between two factors of which one is pervaded (Vyāpta) and the other pervades (vyāpaka). Vyāpti is of two kinds namely Samavyāpti and Visamavyāpti. A vyāpti between two terms of equal extension concomitance, so that we may infer either of them from the other e.g., whatever is nameable is knowable and vice-versa. Visamavyāpti is a relation of non-equipollent concomitance between two terms, from one of which we may infer the other, but not vice-versa. We may infer fire from smoke but not smoke from fire. Therefore Vyāpti is an invariable the middle and the uncontradicted experience of the relation between two things, and not on any a priori principle like causality or essential identity. They, however go further than the vedantins and supplement uncontradicted experience of the relation between two facts by tarka or indirect proof and by sāmānyalakṣana perception.

The Nyāya method of induction or generalization may be analysed into five steps. These are anavaya, vyatireka, vyabhichārgraha, upadhiniśa, tarks and sāmānyalakṣana perception respectively. Anavaya is, when a relation of agreement between two things is in presence, and vyatireka, when this relation is in absence. Vyabhichāragraha is, when we do not observe any contrary instance in which one of them is present without the other. Upadhiniśa is the elimination of upādhis or conditons on which the relation may possible be dependent. Tarks and Sāmānyalakṣana perceptions have their literal meanings about which we have discussed earlier.

Lingaparāmarsa

In now Nyāya theory of Anumāna a middle term is related to major term is lingaparāmarsa. There are five characteristics of a middle term.

1. It must be present in the minor term (Pakṣadharmatā); e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.
2. It must be present in all positive instances in which the major term is present; e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists (sapakṣasattva).
3. It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist (vipakṣasattva).
4. It must be non-incompatible with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire (abādhita).

5. It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., 'the fact of being caused' should not be used to prove the 'eternity' of sound (aviruddha).

**Classification of Anumāna**

Inference is generally classified into svārtha and parātha. In svārthanumāna we do not require formal statements of the members of inference. It is a psychological process. And the parārthanumāna, has to be done only to convince other.

Gotama speaks of three kinds of inference - pūrvavat, sheṣavat and sāmānyatodṛśta. The first two are based on causation and the last one on mere coexistence. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect and an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent of a cause. When we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause we have pūrvavat inference. When we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect we have sheṣavat inference. When inference is based not on causation but on uniformity of co-existences; it is called sāmānyatodṛśta.

Another classification of inference gives us the Kevalānvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki inferences. It is based on the nature of Vyāpti and on the different methods of establishing it. The methods of induction by which universal casual relationship is established may be anvaya, vyatireka or both.

We have kevalānvayi inference when the middle term is always positively related to the major term. The terms agree only in presence, there being no negative of their agreement in absence.

We have kevalavyatireki inference when the middle term is the different of the minor term and is always negatively related to the major term. The terms agree only in absence, there being no positive instance of their agreement in presence.

We have anvayavyatireki inference when the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term. The Vyāpti between the middle and the major is in respect of both presence and absence.

**Hetvābhāsa**

In Indian logic a fallacy is called Hetvābhāsa. It means that middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. All fallacies are material fallacies. We have mentioned the five characteristics of a vail middle term. When these are violated, we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:

1. **Asiddha or Sādhyasama:** This is the fallacy of the unproved middle. The middle term must be present in the minor term (pakṣadharmatā). If it is not, it is unproved. It is of three kinds.
   a. āshrayāsiddha: The minor is the locus of the middle term. If the minor term is unreal, the middle term cannot be present in it; e.g., 'the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the lotus of a lake'.
b. Svarūpāsiddha: Here the minor term is not unreal. But the minor term; e.g., 'sound is a quality, because it is visible'. Here visibility cannot belong to sound which is audible.

c. Vyāpyatvāsiddha: Here Vyāpti is conditional (sopādhika). We cannot say, e.g., 'wherever there is fire there is smoke'. Fire smokes only when it is associated with wet fuel. A red-hot iron ball or clear fire does not smoke. Hence 'Association with wet fuel' is condition necessary to the aforesaid vyāpti. Being conditioned, the middle term becomes fallacious if we say: 'The hill has smoke because it has fire'.

2. Savyabhichāra or Anaikāntika: This is fallacy of the irregular middle. It is of there kinds.

a. Sādhāraṇa: Here the middle term is too wide. It is present in both the sapakṣa (Positive) and the vipakṣa (negative) instance and violates the rule that the middle should not be present in the negative instances (vipakṣāsattva); e.g., 'the hill has fire because it is knowable'. Here 'knowable' is present in fiery as well as non-fiery objects.

b. Asādhāraṇa: Here the middle term is too narrow. It is present only in the pakṣa and neither in the sapakṣa not in the vipakṣa. It violated the rule that the middle term should be present in the sapakṣa (sapakṣaattva); e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is audible'. Here audibility belongs to sound only and is present nowhere else.

c. Anupasamhāri: Here the middle term is non-exclusive. The minor term is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapakṣa or vipakṣa; e.g., 'all things are non-eternal, because they are knowable'.

3. Satpratipakṣa: Here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term. The reason is counter-balanced by another reason. And both are of equal force; e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is audible' and 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counter-balanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force.

4. Bādhita: It is the non-inferentially contradicted middle. Here the middle term is contradicted by some other pramāṇa and not by inference. It cannot prove the major term which is disproved by another stronger source of valid knowledge; e.g., 'fire is cold, because it is a substance'. Here the middle term 'substance' is directly contradicted by perception.

5. Viruddha: It is the contradictory middle. The middle term, instead of being pervaded the presence of the major term in the minor term, it proves its non-existence therein; e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'Produced', instead of proving the eternality of sound, proves its non-eternity.
Upamāna

The third kind of valid cognition is Upamiti and its means is called Upamāna. *Sāmjñāsamjñī Sambandhaṣajñānam Upamitih, tatkaraṇam Upamānam.* It is knowledge derived from comparison and roughly corresponds to analogy. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. For example, a man who has never seen a gavaya or a wild cow and does not know what it is, is told by a person that wild cow is an animal like a cow, subsequently comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow, then his knowledge is due to upamāna. He has heard the word 'gavaya' and has been told that it is like a cow and now he himself sees the object denoted by the word 'gavaya' and recognizes it to be so. Hence upamāna is just the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by that name. It is produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man recognizes a wild cow as a 'gavaya' when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the description that 'a gavaya is an animal like a cow'.

Śabda

Śabda is valid source, of knowledge in all the systems of Indian Philosophy. Also in the Nyāya system, the fourth kind of valid knowledge is Śabda. It is defined, as the statement of a trustworthy person (āptavākya) and consists in understanding its meaning. A sentence is defined as a collection of words and word is defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning. The power in a word to convey its meaning comes, according to ancient Nyāya, from God, and according to later Nyāya, from long established convention. Testimony is always personal. It is based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Testimony is of two kinds- Vaidika and secular (laukika). The Vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God; secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible. Only the words of trustworthy persons who always speak the truth are valid; others are not. A word is a potent symbol which signifies an object and sentence is a collection of words. But a sentence in order to be intelligible must conform to certain conditions. These conditions are four-ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā, sannidhi and tātparya. The first is mutual implication or expectancy. The words of a sentence are interrelated and stand in need of one another in order to express a complete sense. A mere aggregate of unrelated words will not make a logical sentence. It will be sheer nonsense, e.g., 'cow horse man elephant'. The second condition is that the words should possess fitness to convey the sense and should not contradict the meaning. 'Water the plants with fire' is a contradictory sentence. The third condition is the close proximity of the words to one another. The words must be spoken in quick succession without long intervals. If the words 'bring', 'a' and 'cow' are uttered at long intervals they would not make a logical sentence. The fourth condition is the intention of the speaker if the words are ambiguous. For example, the word 'saindhava' means 'salt' as well as a 'horse'. Now, if a man who is taking his food asks another to bring 'saindhava', the latter should not bring a horse.
God

Nyāya accepts the metaphysics of the Vaisēśika School and the accounts of matter, soul and God are almost the same as those in Vaisēśika. The categories, the doctrine of Asatkāryavāda, the account of creation and destruction, the nature of atoms and souls, the account of bondage and liberation, the authority of the Veda, the nature and function of God, the Unseen Power - all these are accepted by Nyāya. While Kaṇḍa himself has not specifically mentioned God, the later Vaisēśikas and particularly the later Naiyāyikas have given and elaborate account of God and the latter have made God's Grace and essential thing for obtaining true knowledge of the realities which alone leads to liberation. They refer to God as the creator, maintainer and destroyer of this world and introduce the element of devotion.

Proofs for existence of God

Nyāya - Vaisēśika gives the following nine arguments to prove the existence of God:

1. The world is and effect and hence is must have and efficient cause. This intelligent agent is God.
2. The atoms being essentially inactive cannot form the different combinations unless God gives motion to them. The Unseen Power, the Adṛṣṭa, requires the intelligence of God. Without God it cannot supply motion to the atoms (Āyojanāt).
3. The world is sustained by God's will. Unintelligent Adṛṣṭa cannot do this. And the world is destroyed by God's will (Dhṛtyādeḥ).
4. A word has a meaning and signifies an object. The power of words to signify their objects comes from God (Padāt).
5. God is the author of the infallible Veda (Pratayataḥ).
6. The Veda testifies to the existence of God (Śruteḥ).
7. The Vedic sentences deal with moral injunctions and prohibitions. The Vedic commands are the Divine commands. God is the creator and promulgator of the moral laws (Vālyāt).
8. According to Nyāya - Vaisēśika the magnitude of a dyad is not produced by the infinitesimal magnitude of the two atoms each, but by the number of the two atoms. Number 'one' is directly perceived, but other numbers are conceptual creations. Numerical conception is related to the mind of the perceiver. At the time of creation, the souls are unconscious. And the atoms and the Unseen Power and space, time, minds are all unconscious. Hence the numerical conception depends upon the Divine Consciousness. So God must exist (Saṅkhyaśeśa).
9. We reap the fruits of our own actions. Merit and demerit accrue from our actions and the stock of merit and demerit is called Adṛṣṭa, the Unseen Power. But this Unseen Power, being unintelligent, needs the guidance of a supremely intelligent God (Adṛṣṭāt).
**Soul**

The law of consation is subservient to the law of Karna. The Nyāya like the Vaisheṣika, believes in teleological creation. The material cause of this universe are the eternal atoms of earth, water fire and air and the efficient cause is God. The infinite individual souls are co-eternal with atoms. And God is co-eternal with atoms and souls and external to both. Nyāya advocates atomism, spiritualism, theism, realism, and pluralism. Creation means combination of atoms and destruction means dissolution of these combinations through the motion supplied to or withdrawn from the atoms by the unseen power working under the guidance of God.

The individual soul is regarded as the substratum of the quality of consciousness which is not the essence God but only an accidental potency. The soul is a real knower, a real enjoyer and a real active agent and an eternal substance. It is not transcendental consciousness and it is different from God who is the supreme soul. Cognitious, affections and conations are the attributes of the soul which is one, partless and all pervading. Each soul has its manas during its empirical life and is separated from it inebriation. It is distinct from the body, the senses and the mind. Bondage is due to ignorance and karma. Liberation is due to knowledge and destruction of karma.

**Vaiśeṣika Philosophy**

Of the various Indian Schools of thought, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika resemble each other. While the Nyāya is concerned primarily with pramāṇa the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is centered around Prameyas.

The word vaiśeṣika is derived from 'Visheṣa' which means particularity or distinguishing feature or distinction. The Vaisheṣika philosophy, therefore, is pluralistic realism which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The category of Visheṣa or particularity is dealt with at length in this system, and is regarded as the essence of things. The founder of this system is Kaṇṭāda who is also known as Kaṇṭabhuk, Uluka and Kaśhyapa. This system of philosophy was, later on, fused together with the Nyāya which accepts the ontology of the former and developed it in the light of its epistemology.

The System is also called after Kaṇṭāda as Kāṇāda or Aulūka darshana. He was called Kaṇṭāda because he used to live as an ascetic on the grains picked up from the fields. Kaṇḍa (in addition to the meaning gain) also means a particle or a particular and the word Kaṇṭāda suggests one who lives on the philosophy of patricularity - Viśeṣa.

Prasasta pāda has written his classical Padārtradharmasaṅgraha with is called a Bhāṣya or commentary on the Vaiśeṣika sūtra of Kaṇṭāda, but is really a very valuable independent treatise. It has been commented upon by Udayana and Shrīdhara. The Vaiśeṣika was later on, fused together with the Nyāya which accepted the ontology out the former and developed it in the light of its epistemology. Thus Shivāditya, LaugākṣiBhāskara, Viswanātha and Annambhatha treat of the two systems together.
Padārtha

As we know that the Vaiśeṣika is ontological aspect of Nyāya system of philosophy, it meditates on metaphysical problems to survive its atomistic pluralism under the shadow of Nyāya's Epistemology. A category is called padārtha and the entire universe is reduced to six or seven padārthas. Padārtha literally means 'the meaning of a word' or 'the object signified by a word'. All object which can be though (jñeya) and named (abhidheya).

Originally the Vaisheṣika believed in the six categories and the seventh, that of abhāva or negation, was added later on. Though Kanāda himself speaks of abhāva, yet the does not give it the status of a category to which it was raised only by the later Vaisheṣikas. The Vaisheṣika divides all existent reals which are all objects of knowledge into two classes - bhāva or being and abhāva or non-being. Six categories come under bhāva and the seventh is abhāva. All knowledge necessarily points to an object beyond and independent of it. All that is real comes under the object of knowledge and is called a padārtha. The seven Padārthas are: (1) Substance (dravya), (2) Quality (guṇa), (3) Action (Karma), (4) Generality (Sāmānya), (5) Particularity (Viśeṣa), (6) Inherence (samavāya), and (7) Non-being (abhāva).

Substance (Dravya)

Substance (dravya) signifies the self - subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. Therefore, it is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities inhere and which is the co-existent material cause of the composite things produced from it. Without substance, we cannot have qualities and actions for they cannot hang loose in the air, but must be contained somewhere. Substance is the basis of qualities and actions. Ultimate substances are eternal, independent and individual and are either infinite or infinitesimal. All compound substances (avayavidravya) which are made of parts and arise out of the simple ultimate substance are necessarily transient and impermanent and subject to production and destruction. But simple ultimate substances which are the material causes of the compound substances are eternal and not subject to production and destruction. The dravyas are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The Vaisheṣika philosophy is pluralistic and realistic but not materialistic since it admits spiritual substances. The nine substances are: (1) Earth (prthivi), (2) Water (AP), (3) Fire (tejas), (4) Air (Vāyu), (5) Ether (ākāsha), (6) Time (kāla), (7) Space (dik), (8) Spirit (ātman) and (9) Mind or the internal organ (manas).

All of them are objective realities. Earth, water, fire, air and manas are atomic and eternal. The first four produce composite things; manas does not. Earth, water, fire, air and ether are the five gross elements. These and manas are physical. Soul is spiritual. Time and space are objective and not subjective forms of experience. Ether, space, time and soul are all - pervading and eternal. Atoms, minds and souls are infinite in number. Ether, space and time are one each.
**Guṇa**

Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. Quality or guṇa is the second category of Vaiśeṣikas. It inheres in a substance and depends for its existence on the substance and is not a constitutive cause of anything. It is called and independent reality because it can be conceived (Prameya), thought (jñeya) and named (abhidheya) independently of a substance where in inheres. The qualities are therefore called objective entities. They are not necessarily eternal. They include both material and mental qualities. They are a static and permanent feature of a substance, while action is a dynamic and transient feature of a substance. A quality, therefore is different from both substance and action. It is defined by Kaṇāda as 'that which inheres in a substance, which does not possess quality of action, which does not produce any composite thing, and which is not the cause of conjunction and disjunction like and action'.

Kaṇāda mentions seventeen qualities to which seven more are added by Prashastapāda. These twenty-four qualities are recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. They include material as well as spiritual properties. Smell is the quality of earth; taste of water; colour of fire; touch of air; and sound of ether. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition are the mental qualities which inhere in the self.

**Karma**

The third category is Karma or action. Like quality, it belongs to and inheres in a substance and cannot exist separately from it. But while a quality is a static and permanent feature of a substance, an action is a dynamic and transient feature of it. Unlike a quality, and action is the cause of conjunction and disjunction. Action is said to be of five kinds: (1) upward movement (Utkṣepaṇa), (2) downward movement (Avakṣepaṇa), (3) contraction (Ākuṭchana), (4) expansion (Prasāraṇa), and (5) locomotion (Gamana).

**Sāmānya**

The fourth category is Sāmānya or generality. It is class-concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common character of the things which fall under the same class. The Sāmānya stands for the common characteristic of certain individuals and does not include the sub-classes. It is the universal by the possession of which different individuals are referred to as belonging to one class. It is called eternal, one and residing in many. It is one, though the individuals in which it resides are many. It is eternal, though the individuals in which it inheres are subject to birth and death, production and destruction. It is common to many individuals. There is the class-essence of the universal of man, called 'man-ness' of 'humanity', which inheres in all individual men. Similarly 'cowness' inheres in all individual cows. Kaṇāda calls generality and particularity as relative to thought (buddhyapekṣa). But this does not mean that the universal and the particular are mere subjective concepts in our mind. Both are objective realities. The universals reside in substances, qualities and action. They are of two kinds, higher and lower.
The Nyāya - Vaisheśika School is an advocate of realism. It believes that both the particulars and
the universals are separately real.

Viśeśa

The fifth category is Viśeśa or Particularity. It enables us to perceive things as different from one
another. Particularity is exclusive. Generality form the basis of assimilation; particularity forms the basis
of discrimination. It is very important to remember that the compositive objects of this world which we
generally call 'particular' objects, are not real 'particulars' according to Nyāya Vaisheśika. The category
of Viśeśa or particularity is invented to defend this position and the Vaisheśika derives its name from.
Each partless ultimate substance has an original peculiarity of its own, and underived uniqueness of its
own which is called 'particularity' or Viśeśa. Viśeśa, therefore, is the different (vyāvartaka) of ultimate
eternal substances (nitysdravyavṛtti) which are otherwise alike. There are innumerable eternal Viśeśas.
They distinguish the substances where they inhere from other substances and they also distinguish
themselves from other particularities. Though they, like qualities and actions, inhere in the substances,
yet they are a distinct category. The Vaisheśika emphasizes realistic pluralism. Atoms, souls, space, time
and manas all have their particularities.

Samavāya

Samavāya is different from conjunction or samyoga which is a separable and transient relation and
is a quality (guṇa). Samavāya is an independent category (padārtha) which means an inseparable eternal,
relation or inherence. Kaṇāda calls it the relation between cause and effect. Prashastapāda defines it as
'the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of
container and the contained, and being the basis of the idea, "this is in that'. The things related by
sāmavāya are inseparably connected (ayutasiddha). It is inseparable relationship'. It is eternal because its
production would involve infinite regress. It is imperceptible and inferred from the inseparable relation
of two things. The things which are inseparably connected are these: the part and whole, the quality and
the substance, the action and the substance, the particular and the universal, the Viśeśa and the eternal
substance. Samavāya is found in these. The whole inheres in the parts; a quality inheres in its substance;
an action inheres in its substance; the universal inheres in the individual members of the same class; the
particularity (visheśa) inheres in its eternal substance. Samavāya is one and eternal relationship subsisting
between two things inseparably connected.

Abhāva

The seventh category is Abhāva or non-existence. Kaṇāda does not mention it as a separate
category. It is added afterwards. The first six categories are positive. This is negative. The other categories
are regarded as absolute, but this category is relative in its conception.
Absence of an object and knowledge of its absence are different. Non-existence is of four kinds: (1) antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva), (2) subsequent non-existence (pradhvamsābhāva) (3) mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva) and (4) absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva). The first is the non-existence of a thing before its production. The second is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction. The third is the non-existence of a thing as another thing which is different from it. The fourth is the absence of a relation between two things in the past, the present and the future. Antecedent negation has no beginning, but has no end. It begins when the things is destroyed and has no end since the same thing cannot be produced again. Mutual negation is exclusion and is opposed to identity. It is both beginnings and endless. Absolute negation is a pseudo-idea. It is both beginningless and endless. Hare’s horn, barren woman’s child, sky-flower etc. are its classical examples. Mutual negation or anyonyābhāva means non-existence of a thing as another thing. The other three negations - antecedent, subsequent and absolute - are called non = existence of correlation or Samsargābhāva which implies the non-existence of something in something else. If antecedent negation is denied, then all things would become beginningless; if subsequent negation is denied, then all things would become eternal; if mutual negation is denied, then all things would become indistinguishable; and if absolute negation is denied, then all things would exist always and everywhere.

**Paramāṇuvāda or Atomism**

According to Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika, the effect does not pre-exist in its cause (Asatkāryavāda), but, is a new beginning, a fresh creation (Ārambhavāda). of course, the effect presupposes a cause. But it is, not contained implicitly in the cause nor is it identical with the cause. the doctrine is also know as Paramāṇukāraṇavāda. We find that the material object of the world are composed of parts and are subject to production and destruction. They are divisible into smaller parts and the latter are further divisible into still smaller parts. By this logic we have to accept the minutest particle of matter which may not be further divisible. This indivisible, partless, partless and eternal particle of matter is called an atom (paramāṇu). All physical things are produced by the combination of atoms. Creation, therefore, means the combination of atoms in different proportions and destruction means the dissolution of such combinations. The material cause of the universe is neither produced nor destroyed, it is the eternal atoms. It is only the atomic the essential nature of the atoms nor do they pre-exist in them. Hence the Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika advocates Asatkāryavāda.

The atoms are said to be of four kinds - of earth, water, fire and air. These atoms combine in geometrical progression and not in arithmetical one. They increase by multiplication and not by mere addition. When motion is imparted to them by the Unseen Power, they begin to vibrate (parispanda) and immediately change into dyada. A dyad is produced by the combination of two atoms. The atoms are its inherent cause; conjunction is its non-inherent cause; and the Unseen Power is its efficient cause. An atom is indivisible, spherical and imperceptible. A dyad (dvyaṅuka) is minute (aṅu), short (hrasva), and imperceptible. Three dyads form a triad (tryaṅuka) which is great (mahat), long (dirgha) and perceptible. And so on by geometrical progression till the gross elements of earth, water, fire and air arise.
The Vaishešika Atomism is not materialistic because the Vaishešika School admits the reality of the spiritual substances - souls and God - and also admits the Law of Karma. The atoms are the material cause of this world of which God, assisted by the Unseen Power, is the efficient cause. The physical world presupposes the moral order. Evolution is due to the Unseen Power consisting of merits and demerits of the individual souls which want to bear fruits as enjoyments or sufferings to be experienced by the souls.

**Causation (Asatkārayavāda)**

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. Plurality of causes is ruled out. The first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence; the fact that it should precede the effect (Purvavarti). The second is its invariability; it must invariably precede the effect (Ananyathāsiddha). Unconditional antecedence is immediate and direct antecedence and excludes the fallacy of remote cause.

An effect (kārya) is defined as the 'counter-entity of its own prior non-existence' (Prāgabhāvapratiyogi). It is the negation of its own prior - negation. It comes into being and destroys its prior non-existence. It was non-existent before its production. Its did not pre-exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation. This Nyāya - Vaishešik view of causation is directly opposed to the Sāṅkhya - Yoga and Vedānta view of satkārayavāda. It is called asatkārayavāda or ārāṃbhavāda. The effect, an epigenesis. It is distinct from its cause and can never be identical with it. It is neither an appearance nor a transformation of the cause. It is newly brought into existence by the operation of the cause.

There are three kinds of causes - Samavāyi, Asamavāyi, and Nimitta. The first is the Samavāyi or the inherent cause, also called as the upādāna or the material cause. It is the substance out of which the effect is produced. For example, the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth and the clay is the inherent cause of a pot. The effect inheres in its material cause. The cloth inheres in the threads. The effect cannot exist separately from its material cause, though the cause can exist independently of its effect. The material cause is always a substance (dravya). The second kind of cause is asamavāyi or non-inherent. It inheres in the material cause and helps the production of the effect. The conjunction of the threads (tantusamyoga) which inheres in the threads is the non-inherent cause of the cloth of which the threads are the material or the inherent cause. The colour of the threads (tanturūpa) is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. The cloth itself is the inherent cause of its colour. The effect as well as its inherent cause both co-inhere in the material cause. The non-inherent cause is always a quality or an action (guṇa or karma). The third kind of cause is nimitta or efficient. It is the power which helps the material cause to produce the effect. The weaver is the efficient cause of the cloth. The efficient cause includes the accessories (sahakāri), e.g., the loom and shuttle of the weaver or the staff and wheel of the potter. The efficient cause may be a substance, a quality or an action.
God

The Vaiśeṣika believes in the authority of the veda and in the moral law of Karma. Kaṇḍāda himself does not openly refer to God. His aphorism - The authority of the Veda is due to its being His (or their) word (tadvachanād āmnāyasya Prāṃpayam) has been interpreted by the commentators in the sense that the Veda is the word of God. But the expression 'Tadvachana' may also be mean that the Veda is the word of the seers. But all great writers of the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣka systems including Prasastapāda, Shridhara and Udayana are openly theistic and some of them give classical arguments to prove the existence of God. God is omniscient, eternal and perfect. He is the Lord. He is guided by the law of Karma representing the unseen power is unintelligent and needs God as the Supervisor and the controller. He is the efficient Cause of the world of which the eternal atoms are the material Cause.

Bondage and Liberation

The Vaiśeṣika also regards bondage as due to ignorance and liberation as due to knowledge. The soul, due to ignorance, performs actions. Action lead to merits and demerits. These merits and demerits of the individual souls make up the unseen moral power, the adṛśta. According to the law of Karma, one has to reap the fruits of actions has performed. The Adṛśta, guided by God, imparts motion to the atoms and leads to creation fortue sake of enjoyment or suffering of the individuals souls.

As long as the soul will go on performing actions, it will be bound. to get rid of bondage, the soul must stop actions. Liberation comes through knowledge. Liberation is the cessation of all life, ask consciousness, all bliss, together with all pain and all qualities. It is quality less, indeterminate, pure nature of the Individual soul as pure substance devoid of all qualities. The liberated soul remains its own peculiar individuality and particularity and remains as it is.

Pūrva Mimāmsa philosophy

The word 'Mimāmsa' literally means 'reveral thought' (Poojito vichārah) and was originally applied to the interpretation of the vedic rituals which commanded highest reverence. The word is now used in the sense of critical investigation. Mimāmsa deals with the earlier portion of the Veda i.e the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa portion and is therefore called Pūrva - Mimāmsa and also Karma mimāmsa. It also deals with Dharma as the main subject and is also called Dharma mimāmsa.

Mimāmsa and Vedānta are treated as allied systems of thought. Both are based on and both try to interpret the Veda. The earlier portion of the Veda, i.e., the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa portion, is called Karmakāṇḍa, while the latter portion, i.e., the Upaniṣads is called Jñānakāṇḍa, because the former deals with the knowledge of reality. Mimāmsā deals with the earlier portion of the Veda and is there fore called pūrva - Mimāṃsā and also Karma - Mimāṃsā. Jaimini was the founder of Purva - mimamsā.
Literature

The earliest work of this system is the Mimamsa sutra of Jaimini. It begins with an enquiry into the nature of Dharma. It is the biggest of all the philosophical Sutras and discusses about one thousand topics. Shabara Swamin has written a great commentary on this work and his commentary has been explained by Prabhakara and Kumarika Bhatta, who differ from each other in certain important aspect and two principle schools of Mimamsa named after them. Prabhakara's commentary Brhati has been commented upon by Shalikanatha who has also written another treatise Prakarana Paichika. Kumarila's huge Commentary on Mimamsa bhasha is divided into three parts - Slokavartika, Tantra Vartika and Updik, the first of which has been commented upon by Parthasarathy Misra who has also written his Sastradipika. Tradition makes Prabhakara a pupil of Kumari who nicknamed him as 'guru' on account of his great intellectual powers.

Sruti and its importance

The aim of the Mimamsa is to ascertain the nature of Dharma. Dharma is not a physical existent, and so it cannot be apprehended through the senses. The other pramanas are of no use, since they all presuppose the work of perception. Perception, inference and such other sources of knowledge have nothing to say on the point that the performer of the Agnishoma sacrifice will go to heaven. This knowledge is derived only from the Vedas. Though the Pramana of the Veda is the only source of our knowledge of dharma, the others are considered, since it is necessary to show that they cannot give rise to a knowledge of dharma. They are also found useful in repudiating wrong views.

The kernel of the Veda consist of those declaration in injunctive form which prompt men towards certain modes of action by declaring that such action leads to beneficial results. Accepting that ritual is all in all in the Vedas, Jaimini holds that parts apparently unconnected with it are useless, and so they have to be interpreted as bearing on ritual injunctions. Other texts are authoritative only in so far as they help the individual to action. The Mimamsakas attempt to prove that every part of the sacred text refers to acts of duty.

The Vedas are eternal, since the words of which they are composed are eternal. The relationship between the word and its meaning is natural and not created by convention. The cognitions brought about by Vedic injunctions cannot be set aside at any time or place or under and conditions. It is a self contradiction to assert that the injunction expresses something which is not true. The Vedas manifest their own validity. Words used by us denote things that can be cognised by other means of knowledge; and, if we cannot know them through other means, then those who utter them must be of unquestionable authority. So non - Vedic utterances do not possess any inherent validity. Prabhakara holds that non - Vedic verbal cognition is of the nature in inference. Only the verbal cognitions afforded by the Veda is strictly verbal, but it is not in consistency with the other theory of the self - validity of all cognitions. Since there in no author of Vedic texts, there is no possibility of defects, and so the non-authoritativeness of the Vedas is inconceivable. As the utterances of human beings are valid, if their authors are trustworthy, Kumari considers them also to be sabdapramana.
Classification of Śrutivāktas (Vidhi, Niśedha and Arthvāda)

Vedas are broadly divided into the Mantras and the Brahmanas. The contents of the Veda are also classified into 1. Injunctions (vidhi) 2. Hymns (mantras), 3. Names (nāmadheya) 4. Prohibitions (niśedha), and 5. Explanatory passages (arthavāda).

Injunction which impel one to action in expectation of certain results, such as "One who is desirous of heaven is to sacrifice" (svargakāmo yajeta), are the most important. There are subsidiary injunctions which describe the details of the sacrifice, the order in which the several parts of it are to be carried out, as well as the persons who are entitled to perform them. The mantras are largely useful in reminding the sacrificer of the different matters connected with the sacrifice, such as the deities to whom oblations are to be made. Some of the mantras are said to possess a mystical or supersensuous effect and to contribute directly to the transcendental result, Apūrva. Names indicate the results to be obtained by the sacrifices. Niśedhas are only vidhis in disguise. Arthavādas comprise the sentence which contain either praise of the things enjoined (praśamsa), or a censure of things prohibited (nindā), as well as description of the doings of others (parakṛti) and instances from history (Pūralikā) (Arthasaṃgraha).

Max muller's view that the Mīmāṃsā is theistic can be accepted if the Mīmāṃsā is to be judged by the vedic ancestry, But judged by what the Mīmāṃsā itself does and says, this contention cannot be fully accepted. When we find that the early Mīmāṃsakas are silent God and later ones reject the proofs for the existence of God,

Śabdanyavāda

The Mīmāṃsakas propound the theory that words (śabdas) are not really the perceived sounds (dhvanis). The sound produced by the speaker and perceived by the hearer and only the revealers of the words which are not themselves produced. Words are really the letters which are partless and uncaused. Though these letter - sounds vary, we recognise that the same letter is pronounced by all of them. This identity of the letter shows that it is not produced at any time and place, but transcends them. So the words as letters may be regarded as eternal, that is, as having existence, but being uncaused. This Mīmāṃsakas theory is known as Śabdanyavāda.

Jātiśaktivāda

Jaimini sets forth positive considerations in support of this view. The words is ever present, since the utterance of it is only for the purpose of manifesting it to others. There cannot be any effort manifest a non-existing thing. For non - eternal things, cause of destruction are found, but we do not find causes for the destruction of words. The sound produced from air is distinct from the word which it serves to manifest. Besides, we have many Vedic texts insisting on the eternal nature of words.

Jātiśaktivāda

Mīmāṃsakas' theory of jātiśaktivāda states that universals (Jāti) are eternal and have potency (sakti) to manifest ēkāritis and seem as different kinds of individuals. Words denote classes and not
individuals. When we say "bring a cow", we do not mean a particular cow, but any animal possessing the features of a cow. The word denotes the class or form, since it has action for its object. If individuals are denotes by words, a generic idea like "cow" would be impossible. Again, a word cannot denote all the individuals, since then it would possess as many potencies as there are individuals. I cannot denote a collection of individuals, since then it would be undergoing changes, as some individuals die out and others get in. Again, if the word means a single individual only, there cannot be an eternal connection between word and meaning, and action would be impossible, as it would be difficult to decide which individual is meant. If individuals are object denoted, then since they are not omnipresent, there cannot be a relation between a word and its meaning. Ākṛti is eternal, and is therefore capable of relationship with the eternal word.

**Dharma and Bhāvanā**

Dharma is the subject of inquiry in Mīmāṁsā. The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā sūtra begins with the enquiry about the nature of dharma. "Ātnāto dharma jijnāsa" Jaimini defines dharma as a command or injunction which impels men to action. Chodānakṣaṇārtho dharmah It is the supreme duty, the 'ought' the 'categorical imperative'. Artha and Kāma which deal with ordinary common mortality are learnt by worldly intercourse. But Dharma and Mokṣa which deal with true spirituality are revealed only by the Veda. Dharma is supra-sensible and consists in the commands us to do certain acts and to refrain from doing certain other acts. The authoritativeness of the Veda is supported by social consciousness as well as by individual conscience. Dharma and adharma deal with happiness and pain to be enjoyed or suffered in the life beyond. Actions performed here produce an unseen potency (apūrva) in the soul of the agent which yields fruit when obstructions are removed and time becomes ripe for its fructification. The apūrva is the link between the act and its fruit. It is the causal potency (shakti) in the act which leads to its fructification. Actions are first divided into three kinds - obligatory (which must be performed, for their violation results in sin though their performance leads to no merit); optional (which may or may not be performed; their performance leads to merit, though their non-performance does not lead to sin); and prohibited (which must not be performed, for their performance leads to sin, though their non-performance does not lead to merit).

The earlier Mīmāṁsaka believed only in dharma (and not in mokṣa) and their ideal was the attainment of heaven (svarga). But later Mīmāṁsakas believe in mokṣa and substitute the ideal of heaven by that of liberation (apavarga). Prabhākara and Kumārila both believe that the goal of human life is liberation. The soul is chained to Samsāra on account of its association with the body, the senses, the mind and the understanding. Through this association, the soul becomes a knower, an enjoyer and an agent. This association is due to karma which the cause of bondage. When the cause is removed, the effect also ceases to exist. So abstention from karma automatically leads to the dissolution of the 'marriage-tie' of the soul with the body. The senses, the mind etc. and consequently to the return of the soul to its pure nature as a substance rid of all qualities and modes including consciousness and bliss also.
School of Distance Education

Kumarila And Prabhakara Schools of Mīmāṃsā

Jaimini's Sutra, in twelve elaborate chapters, laid the foundation of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Śabarasvāmin wrote the major commentary or Bhāṣya on this work. He is followed by a long line of commentators and independent writers. The two most important among them are Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhakara (nicknamed 'Guru'), who founded the two schools of Mīmāṃsā named after them, and thus the Mīmāṃsā philosophy gradually developed. The defence of Vedic supremacy from Buddhist criticism was also a major cause of coming these schools in light. Shabarāsvāmin's commentary on 'Mīmāṃsa - sutra' has been explained by Prabhakara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who differ from each other in certain important respects. Prabhakara's commentary Bṛhati has been commented upon by Shālikanātha who has also written another treatise Prakaraṇa - pañci. Kumārila's huge work is divided into three parts - Shlokavārtika, Tantravārtika and Ṭuptikā, the first of which has been commented upon by Pārthasarathi Mishra who has also written his Śāstrādhipi. Tradition makes Prabhakara a pupil of Kumārila who nicknamed him as 'Guru' on account of his great intellectual powers. But some scholars like Dr. Gangāṇātha Jha believe that Prabhakara school is older and seems to be nearer the spirit of the original Mīmāṃsā.

Their Major Points of Difference

Validity of Knowledge

Similarity - Both accept svataḥpramāṇyavāda,

Difference - Prabhakara - defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubhuti). All apprehension is direct and immediate and valid per se.

Kumārila - defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object which is Produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge.

Pramāṇa

Similarity -

1. Both regard knowledge itself as pramāṇa or means of knowledge.
2. Both recognize two kinds of knowledge - immediate and mediate.
3. Perception is regarded as immediate knowledge by both.
4. Both admit two stages in perception - indeterminate and determinate.
5. Both accept that inferential argument has only three members - Pratijñā, major premise and minor premise.
6. Both accept the eternity of veda and of words.
7. Both argues that significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any special sphoṭs.
Difference -

1. Prabh. - accepts five pramāṇas - Perception, inference, testimony, Comparison and Implication.
   Kuma. - accepts six pramāṇas- perception, inference, testimony, comparison, Implication and non - apprehension. (Jaimini accepts only three - perception, inference and testimony)

2. P. - Defines perception as direct apprehension. (sākṣāt pratitiṣṭ pratyakṣam)
   K. - Defines perception as direct knowledge produced by the proper contact of the sense organs with the presented objects, which is free from defects.

3. P. - Holds the inference involves a previous knowledge of the general relation and refers to things already known.
   K. - Makes novelty an essential feature of inference. The object of the inferential cognition is something that is not already known.

4. P. - The facts observed by implication remain inconsistent or doubtful until the assumption is made. In inference there is no room for any element of doubt
   K. - Arthāpatti helps us to reconcile two apparently inconsistent facts. There is no such inconsistency between well - ascertained facts in inference.

5. P. - Does not accept non - apprehension as an independent source of knowledge.
   K. - Accepts non - apprehension as an independent source of knowledge.

**Error**

P. - Prabhākara's theory of error is known as Akhyātivāda.
K. - Kumārila's theory of error is Viparitakhyāti.

**Self**

Similarity - Both admit the plurality of the individual souls and regard the self as an eternal, omnipresent, ubiquitous, infinite substance which is the substratum of consciousness and which is a real knower, enjoyer and agent.

Difference -

1. P. - Consciousness is only an accidental quality of soul.
   K. - Consciousness is modal change in the self

2. P. - Advocates the theory of simultaneous revelation of knower, known and knowledge (triputipratyakṣavāda).
   K. - advocates the theory of cognizedness of objects (jñatatavāda).

3. P. - accepts self as a subject of very knowledge
   K. - Accepts self as the object of self - consciousness
Liberation

Similarity -

1. Both believe that the goal of human life is liberation, though conceive it in a negative sense.

2. Both admit that abstention from karma means abstention from the optional and the prohibited kinds of karma only

Difference -

P. - Does not regard liberation as a state of bliss. (According to Pārthasārathi)

(ii)  Regard liberation as the state of bliss. (According to Nārāyana Bhaṭṭa)

Tripuṭi - Samvit

Prabhākara is and advocate of Trupuṭiṣamvit, According to which the knowledge, the known and the knowledge are given simultaneously in very act of cogniton. Knowledge reveals itself aswellas the knower and the known. In the consciousness "I know this" (aham idam jānāmi), we have the three or the object (viṣayavitti), and the conscious awareness (svasamvitti). All consciousness is at the same time whether inferential or verbal, the self is known directly through the agency and the contact of the manas.

Jñātāta

Kumarila's theory of knowledge is known as jñātatavāda. Knowledge is a movement brought about by the activity of the self. Which results in producing consciousness of objective things. Cognition of a certain object ends not in a further cognition of that cognition, but in the cognisedness (prakaṭatā) of the object. An act of knowledge has four elements in it. 1. the Knower (jñātā); 2. the object of knowledge (jñēya); 3. the instrument of the cognisedness of the object (jñātatā). According to Kumārila, a cognition is not directly perceived, but is inferred from the cognisedness (jñātatā, prākaṭya) of the object produced by the cognition. Every act of cognition implies a certain relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, which involves some activity on the part if the perceiver. The presence of the relationship enables us to infer the action of the agent, which is cognition, in the case of knowledge. The cognition is inferred from the relation between the knower and the known, which is apprehended by internal perception (mānasaprātyakṣa).

Apprehendedness (jñātatā) is nothing but the character of being the object of cognition. The nature of objectivity is hard to define. If objectivity means that cognition is produced by the object, then even sense - organs and other conditions producing the cognition have to be regarded as objects. Again, it is not possible for a property to be produced in an object at a time when the object does not exist. Apprehendedness is a property of the objects, though it cannot be produced in past and future ones, which are also apprehended.
**Abhāva and Anupalabdhi**

Kumarila admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent source of knowledge. Dissimilarity is only want of similarity, and it is accounted for by the principle of non-apprehension. When we say "There is no jar in this place", we cognise the absence of the jar. Absence (abhāva) cannot be apprehended by perception, which stands in need of sense-contact with a present object, which is not possible in the case, nor can non-existence be apprehended by the other pramāṇas. Nonapprehension is a means of knowledge (mānam) with reference to the object negated. We perceive the vacant space and think of the absence of the jar. We may say that the non-existence of the jar is as much perceived as the vacant space, yet, since perception involves contact of an actual object with the senses, we cannot identify the act of non-apprehension with perception. We perceive the vacant space, remember the jar that is absent, and then we have the knowledge of the absence of the jar, which has no reference to the act of perception. Apprehension of non-existence is through anupalabdhi. Abhāva is side to be a positive object of knowledge. What we call emptiness is the locus unoccupied by any object.

Prabhākara does not accept non-apprehension as an independent source of knowledge. The cognition of non-existence is inferred from the non-perception of something that would have been perceived if it were present. When we perceive the mere space and no jar in it, we say that there is no jar. The cognition of the substratum by itself (tanmātradhi) is what answers to non-apprehension. Kumārila disputes this view. We may perceive not merely empty space, but space filled by books and paper, but that will also give us a knowledge of the non-existence of the jar. If we say that we apprehend space as not qualified by the jar, we are admitting negative knowledge. Therefore, abhāva, cannot be reduced to perception, and, is an independent valid source of knowledge.

**Anvitābhidhānavāda**

According to Prabhākara, who accepts the theory of Anvitābhidhānavāda, the meaning of the words can be known only when they occur in a sentence enjoining some duty, and so words denote objects only as related to the other factors of such sentence. If they are not related to an injunction, but simply remind us of meanings, it is case of remembrance, which is not valid cognition.

Since the potency of the word originates from the separate potencies of the letters, the latter are said to be the direct cause of verbal cognition. The cognition of the meaning of the word is not obtained through sense-perception. The senses present the letters which possess the power to bring about the words have naturally denotative powers by which they refer to objects whether we understand their meanings or not.

**Abhihitānvayavāda**

According to the Abhihitānvayavāda accepted by Kumārila's followers, the knowledge of meanings is due to words; but this knowledge is not due to recollection or apprehension, but to denotation. Words...
denote meanings which, when combined, give rise to a knowledge of there is such a relationship between the word and its meaning is directly cognisable. If one does not recognise it, when one hears the word for the first time, it only means that the accessories are absent, but that does not makes the relationship non-existent. It the eye cannot see without light, it does not mean that the eye is incapable of seeing altogether. The accessory is the knowledge that such - and such a word denotes such - and - such- and object, which is gained from experience. The expressiveness of the word belongs to it by its very nature. This is absolutely true of common names like jar and the like, where the relation of the words to their meanings is independent of any convention.

**Vedanta Philosophy**

Vedanta means the last portion of the vedas or the end of the vedas which consists of the Upaniṣads. Hence the system of philosophy based on the Upaniṣads it is called the Vedanta Darshanam. It is called Vedanta, firstly because they are the literally the concluding portion, the end of the Vedas, secondly because they are the essence, the cream, the height, of the vedic philosophy. The passages in the Upaniṣads are manifold. Some of them clearly speak of the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme being. ‘तत्त्वमसि’, - ‘अयमात्मा वर्ग’ etc. While there are passages which appear to speak of the difference between the individual soul the God and the matter. Such passages have give rise to the different interpretations and Vyāsa, also called Bādarāyaṇa wrote the Brahmasūtras inorder to clear the apparent contradictions of the Upaniṣad passages and show that the fundamental doctrine of all the Upanisads is the identification of the individual soul (Jeeva) with the Supreme soul (Brahma,). The evidence of experience which show a multiplicity of phenomena and the statements of the Vedas which speak of souls are only true till true knowledge of the Brahman is required. The Ultimate cause of all false impressions is Avidya or ignorance. The illusion caused by the Avidya vanishes through the acquisition of true knowledge.

**Prastānatraya**

The Vedanta Darshanam, as its very name implies deals with the Upaniṣads which are the end-portions (anta =end) of the Vedas and also contain the essence (anta core or essence) of the Same. The system itself is based on three canonical works, the Upaniṣads, the Brahma Sūtra and the Bhagavad gīta. The Upaniṣads are called ‘Śruti Prastāna’, the Brahma Sūtras, 'Nyāya Prastāna', and the Bhagavad gīta, Smṛti-Prastāna traya'. 'Prastāna means a school of philosophy.

**The Upaniṣads**

The Upaniṣads are the concluding portion as well as the cream of the Veda and are therefore rightly called 'Vedanta'. The word Upanisad is derived from the root 'Sad' which means 1) to sit down 2) to destroy and 3) to loosen. (Gati, Avasādanam and Viśaraṇam) 'Upa' means near by 'and 'ni' means devotedly. The word therefore means the sitting down of the disciple near his teachers in a devoted manner to receive instruction about the height reality which loosens all doubts and destroys all ignorance.
of the disciple. Gradually the word come to signify any secret teaching about reality and it is used by the Upaniṣads in this sense (Rahasya vidyā). The Muktikōpaniṣad gives the number of the Upaniṣads as 108. But ten or eleven Upaniṣads are regarded as important and authentic, on which Śankarācharya has commented. These are 1) Iśāväsyopaniṣad 2) Kenōpanisad 3) Kaṭhōpaniṣad 4) Praśnōpaniṣad 5) Muṇḍakopaniṣad 6) Māndūkyopaniṣad 7) Taṉṭiriyopaniṣad 8) Aitareyopaniṣad 9) Chandogyopaniṣad and 10) Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad. The teaching, being the highest, was imparted at private sittings only to the qualified disciples.

The Upaniṣads contain the quintessence of Vedic religion and philosophy. The Śaddrā́śaṇaś or six systems of Indian Philosophy derive their strength and inspiration from them. The Vedanta Systems are entirely an outcome of their, study. The idea of Mokṣa and the primary goal of life, which has permeated the Indian religions and culture of the succeeding centuries, owes its origin entirely to the Upaniṣads and they are the basis of Prastāṇatrāya. The depth as well as the catholicity of their thought has attracted the attention of the savants of other religions and Societies also, resulting in their being translated in to other languages too.

**Brahma Sūtra**

The Brahma Sūtras claims to be an aphoristic summary of the Upaniṣads. The work derives its name from the fact that it deals chiefly with Brahman as described in the Upaniṣads, in all its aspects. It is also known other names as a) The Vedāntasūtras b) The Śārīraka Sūtras c) The Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtras and d) The Bīṣṇu - Sūtras. Tradition accepts, Bādarāyaṇa, is the author of this work.

The work Brahma Sūtra is divided into four adhyāyas. Each adhyāya is divided into four pādās, the pādās comprise adhikaraṇās and each adhikaraṇa composed of Sūtras. The total number of adhikaraṇas and Sūtras are 191 and 555 respectively. Each pāda of the various adhyāyas, comprises several adhikaraṇas. An adhikaraṇa needs must have five parts and they are 1) Viṣaya or topic 2) Viṣaya or Samśaya, doubt 3) Pūrvapakṣa or opponent's view 4) Siddhānta or established conclusion and 5) Saṅgatior ir connection between the different sections. The four adhyāyas in Brahma Sūtra are 1) Samanvayādhyāya 2) Avirodhādhyāya 3) Sādhanādhyāya and 4) Phalādhyāya. The first Adhyāya attempts to harmonise (Samanvaya) the principles dealt with in the Various Upaniṣads. The second Adhyāya applies itself to dispel any Virodha or contradiction that many confront the philosophy of Vedanta. Sādhanādhyāya discusses the various Vidyās or meditations mentioned in the Upaniṣads. The fourth one, Phalādhyāya dissed the phala of the study of Vedanta. The work Start with the Sūtra “�थवऽ तन्म मया चित्र विपिनात्रहरूत्पति शब्दात”.

The Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa has attracted the attention of the distinguished scholars over the years, who have enriched the Brahmasūtra literature by their brilliant commentaries. Of the several bhāṣyas or commentaries available today Śankarācharya's bhāṣya is the earliest. Rāmānuja's 'Śrībhāṣya, Madhva's Aṇubhāṣya are also important. Bhāṣkarācharya, Nimbārka, Val Scratcha, Baladeva are also the commentators this great work.
Śankaracharya wrote bhāṣya in Adwaita point of view. Padmapāda, the direct disciple of Śankara wrote Pañcapādika on BrahmaSutra Śankarabhāṣya. This was commented up on Prakāśātman in his PañcapādikaVivaraṇa. There is a gloss on this called Tattvadīpanam by Akhaṇḍānanda Muni. All these commentaries collectively have created the Vivaraṇa Prastāna in Advaita Vedanta in the post-Śankara period. As opposed to this Bhāmatiprastāna was developed by Vāchaspatimiśra by writing a commentary called Bhāmati on BrahmaSūtraŚankaraBhāṣya. Amalānandā's 'Kalpataru' and Appayyadikṣīta's 'Parimalām' are also famous commentaries in their School of thought. ŚankṣepaŚārirakam' of Sarvajñātma and 'Vivaraṇa Prameya' of Vidyāraṇya are also important BrahmaSutra commentaries.

**Bhagavad Gītā**

Bhagavad gītā literally means 'The Lord's song' ie, the philosophical discourse of Lord Kṛiṣhṇa to persuade the reluctant Arjuna to fight. It is the included in the great epic Mahābhāratā's Bhīṣma parva. The book itself, comprising eighteen chapters called Yogās. It is a poetical work, composed in Anuśṭupp Vṛtta in the form of a dialogue between ŚriKṛiṣhṇa and Arjuna on the battle field of Kurukṣetra. Where there is Kṛiṣhṇa the Supreme Lord or Yogeśwara, and the Lord of vision, Arjuna the man of action there is sree, vijaya, neeti, and bhooti says Bhagavatgītā. Arjuna, the recipient of the teachings, though himself a great worrior, is a typical representative of the humans, liable to be upset or confused during periods of crisis. The questions and doubts he rises and the solutions that ŚriKṛiṣhṇa offers are not only relevant but also valid even today. The fundamental metaphysical teaching of the Gita is that of the unreal thereis no being; and the real thereis no non being. The Gita represents a unique Synthesis of Action, Devotion and Knowledge. Gītā is a practical treatise of the teachings of the Upaniṣad.

**Pre-Sankara Advaita Vedanta**

The Prastānatraya or the three basic works of vedanta on which almost every great Ācharya has commented. The Upaniṣads are regarded as Śhruti by the Vedantins and their teachings were summerized by Bādarāyana in his Brahmasūtra and were developed in to the school of Advaita Vedanta by its first Systematic expounder Gaudapāda.

The Māṇḍukya Kārika or Gaudapādākārika also known as the Agama-Śāstra is the first available systematic treatise on Advaita Vedanta. Tradition says Gandapāda was the teacher of Govindapāda who was the teachers of Śrīsankara Śrīsankara himself most respectfully salutes Gandapāda as his grand teachers (paramaguru) and he also commented Gaudapāda's Māṇḍukyakārika.

The fundamental doctrine of Gaudapāda is the Doctrine of No - Origination (Ajādivāda). It means that the world being only an appearance, is in fact never created. Absolute being self existent, is never created (Aja). The doctrine of Asparśhayoga or Amanibhava or Vaiśhāradya is Gaudapāda's own contribution to Advaita Philosophy.
Sri Śankara of the 8th century A.D., played a very prominent part in the cultural history of India as
a mystic philosopher, commentator of prastānatraya, great teacher and a systematc propounder of Advaita
Vedanta Philosophy. Śri Śankara was born in Kaladi. His parents are Śivaguru and Āryāmba. Śankara
lived barely for 32 Years, but that short span of life was full of tremendous constructive activity and
dynamic universal thought. Śankara expounded Advaita Philosophy in his monumental Bhāṣya on
Prastānatraya and also many minor works such as Vivekachūḍāmanī, Ātmabodha, Daśāṅgūḍamūrtistotra,
UpadesaSāhasri, DaśāŚloki, Śatasloki, BhajaGovindan, Soundaryalahari etc.

Philosophy of Śri Śankara

Ultimate reality, according to Śri Śankara is Ātman or Brahman which is pure consciousness.
(Jñāna Swarupa) which is devoid of all attributes (Nirguṇa) and all categories of the intellect (Nirviśeṣa)
Brahman associated with its potency māya appears as qualified Brahman. (Saguṇa Brahman or Iśwara)
who is the creator of this world Jiva or the individual self is a subject object complex. Avidhy is the root
cause of the individuality. In liberation, when avidya is destroyed by jñāna and the Jiva is realised as the
Brahman which it always is. Maya or Avidya is not pure illusion. It is not only the absence of knowledge,
It is also positive wrong knowledge. It is indescribable ((सतर्कश्च अनिवर्तनीयम्) It is positive and (भावरूप)
it is विगुणात्मक, when right knowledge dawns and the essential unity of the jīva with Brahman is realised,
Māya vanishe. Śankara Charya emphasizes that from the phenomenal point of view the world is quite
real. It is not an illusion. The world is quite real so long as the true knowledge of the nature of Jagat is not
dawn. 'ब्रह्मस्य जगविश्वा जगन्निध्यं श्रीवेदो नापर्य? ' is the summary of Śri Śankara's teachings. Advaita
Vedanta may be summarised in this verse: Brahman is the only reality; the world is Ultimate false; and
the individual soul is not different from Brahman. This oneness of Jiva and Brahma can be attained by
manaṇa of the Upaniṣads and the Mahāvākyas like प्रह्लादन् ब्रह्म (Aitareyopaniṣad) अपमात्मा ब्रह्म
(Māndukyopaniṣad) तत्त्वमसि (Chandogyopaniṣad) and अहं ब्रह्मामि (Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad) Śankara
maintains Brahma kāraṇa vāda as he recognizes that Brahman is the cause of the world. The theory is
also called vivarta vāda because it takes the world to be only a phenomenal appearance of Brahman -Śankara's
theory of illusions is called Vivarta Vāda. Advaitins believe in Anirvachaniyakhyāti vāda also.

Padmapāda, Śureswara, Totaka and Hastāmalaka are the four direct disciples of Śri Śankara
Ācharya constitute four muṭṭṣ in Śringeri, Puri, Dwāraka and Badarināth to establish the Advaita
Philosophy and spread its message to the future generations.
The Philosophy of Advaita Vedanta

Brahman

From the objective side this ultimate reality is called Brahman. The word is derived from the root 'Bṛh' which means to grow or to evolve. Brahman is that which spontaneously bursts forth as nature and soul. It is the ultimate cause of this universe. In the Chāndogya, it is cryptically described as 'Tajjalān' - as that (tat) from which world arises (ja), into which it returns (la), and by which it is supported and it lives (an). In the Taittirīya, Brahman is defined as that from which all these beings are born, by which they live, and into which they are reabsorbed.

Brahman is the only reality. It is absolutely indeterminate and non duel. It is beyond speech and mind. It is indescribable because no description of it can be complete. The best description of it is through the negative formula 'neti, neti'. The basic cause of the universe and the cause of all causes is called Brahman by the Upaniṣads. Ātman, Sat, Akṣaram, Ākāsa, are the other appellations used for Brahman. The world rises out of him, is supported by him and gets dissolved back in to him. (पत्रो वा इमानि भूलानि जायने, येन जाताति जीवानि, यत् प्रसन्नोभिप्रेयंविशालि, तत्तिज्ञातास्वभ ब्रह्मि। The Swarūpalakṣaṇa of Brahma is ‘तत्त्व ज्ञानमर्थं ब्रह्म’ Ātman is the same as Brahman. It is pure consciousness. It is the self which is self - luminous and which transcends the subject - object duality. It is the unqualified absolute. It is the only reality. There is no duality and no diversity at all. It is self proved or original (Svayam Siddha) All means of cognitions (pramāṇas) are founded on it and he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. (श्रवाविन्द्र ब्रह्मम भवति।)

Iśwara

The Brahman reflected in or conditioned by Māya, is called Iśwara. Iśwara is the personal aspect of the impersonal Brahman. Iśwara is known as Aparna Brahman or Saguṇa Brahman. Iśwara is the perfect personality. He is the lord Māya. He is immanent in the whole universe which he controls from within. He is called Antaryāmin (immanent inner rules) He is the creator, Sustainer and destroyer of the Universe.

Rejection Difference

ŚrīŚamkara says that there is no multiplicity here (nehā nānā asti kīcāna), that one who sees the many here is doomed to death (‘Mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum ānūtiāya miha nāneva paśyati). In explanation of the unity of all things, which appear to be many, examples like these are cited: Justas different articles made of gold are all really one, gold is the only real substance in them and the different names and forms (nāma-rūpa) which make them appear as many, are merely matters of verbal distinction, similarly in all objects there is the same Reality, and their differences are merely verbal. The objects of the world are denied separate, individual existences. Brahman (or Ātman) is also described not as Creator, but as a Reality which is indescribable, being not only unspeakable but even unthinkable. Difference or multiplicity seen in this world is only due to Māyā, Māya is also as avidyā, ajñāna, adhyāsa etc.
Adhyāsa

It is self-evident, says ŚrīShaṅkara, that the Subject and the object are absolutely opposed to each other like light and darkness. The subject is pure Consciousness; the object is Unconsciousness. The one is the ultimate. 'I'; The other is the 'non-I'. Neither these two nor their attributes can, therefore, be identified. Yet it is the natural and common practice of people that they wrongly superimpose the object and its attributes upon the subject and error, this coupling of the real and the unreal (satyānṛttramithuniṭṭṭa) is called superimposition (adhyāsa) or error (bhrama) or illusion (māya) or ignorance (avidyā). All definitions of error agree in maintaining that error is the superimposition of one thing on another, e.g., the superimposition of silver o shell or the illusion of the moons on a single moon. This superimposition the learned call 'ignorance', and the realization of the true nature of reality by discarding error, they call 'knowledge'. This transcendental Ignorance is the presupposition of all practices of this phenomenal world. Superimposition, therefore, is the notion of a thing is something else (atasmin tadbuddhiḥ). This unreal beginningless cycle superimposition goes on leading to the false notions of the agent and the enjoyed and to all phenomenal practices. The study of the Vedānta texts is undertaken in order to free oneself from this false notion of superimposition and thereby realize the essential unity of the Self.

Māyā

Brahman is the only Reality; the world is ultimately false; and the individual soul is non-different from Brahman. Brahman and Ātman or the Supreme Self are synonymous terms. The world is a creation of Māya. The individual selves on account of their inherent Avidyā imagine themselves as different from Brahman and mistake Brahman as this world of plurality, even as we mistake a rope as a snake. Avidyā vanishes at the dawn of knowledge - the supra-relational direct and intuitive knowledge of the non-dual self which means liberation.

The words Māya, Avidyā, Ajñāna, Adhyāsa, Adhyāropa, Akṣara, Bijashakti, Mūka-prakṛti etc, are recklessly used in Vedānta as very nearly synonymous. Of these Māya, Avidyā, Adhyāsa and Vivarta are very often used as interchangeable terms. There are two schools among later Advaitins divided on the question whether Māya and Avidyā are identical or different. The general trend of the Advaitins including Śhīkara himself has been to treat these two terms as synonymous and to distinguish between the two aspects of Māya or Avidyā which are called āvaraṇa and vikṣepa, the former being the negative aspect of concealment and the latter the positive aspect of projection.

Māya or Avidyā is not pure illusion. It is not only absence of knowledge. It is also positive wrong knowledge. It is a cross of the real and the unreal (satyānṛttee mithuni kṛtya). In fact it is indescribable. For the appearance of Brahman as the world. It cannot be both existent and none-existent for this conception is self-contradictory. It is called neither real nor unreal (sadasadvilalkṣana). It is false or mithyā. But it is not a non-entity like a hare’s horn (tuchchha). It is positive (bhāvarūpa). It is potency (shakti). It is also called superimposition (adhyāsa). A shell is mistaken as silver. The shell is the ground on which the
silver is superimposed. When right knowledge (pramā) arises, this error (bhṛnti or bhrama) vanishes. The relation between the shell and the silver is neither that of identity nor of difference nor of both. It is unique and is known as non-difference (tādātmya). Similarly, Brahman is the ground on which the world appears through Māyā. When right knowledge dawns and the essential unity of the jīva with the Paramātman is realized, Māyā or Avidyā vanishes.

**Three grades of sattā**

The world possesses three different grades of existence. The first kind of facts possesses only ephemeral existence (prātibhāsika sattā or apparent existence); the second empirical or virtual existence, the sort of existence necessary for ordinary life and practice (vyāvahārika sattā or practical existence) and the third absolute existence (pāramārthika sattā or supreme existence). The world is thus not a homogeneous conception; and if, in spite of this one insists on being told what such a world (as a whole) is, the fairest reply can only be, what Śaṅkara gives, namely that it is indescribable (anirvacanīya) either as real or as unreal. But if the word, world, is confined only to the second aspect, it would be again fair to say, that the world is real only for practical purpose, more real than the first and less real than the third kind of existence. But if the word is taken in the third sense, Śaṅkara would emphatically assert that the world is eternally real. As he puts it: "As the cause, Brahman, does not lack existence at any time, past, present or future, so does the world not lack existence in any of three periods of time". Again, "All particular modes of existence with different names and forms are real as existence, but unreal as particulars".

**Jīva**

Jīva or the individual self is a subject-object complex. Its subject-element is Pure Consciousness and is called the Sākṣin. Its object-element is the internal organ called the antaṅkāraṇa which is bhautika as it is composed of all the five elements, with the predominance of tejas which makes it always active except in deep sleep or states like swoon or trance. The source of the internal organ is Avidyā which causes individuality. In perception, the internal organ, when a sense-organ comes into contact with an object, assumes the 'form' of that object. It is the vṛtti or the mode of the internal organ. This vṛtti inspired by the Sākṣin takes the form of empirical knowledge. In waking state, the internal organ is aided by the senses; in dream state, it functions by itself; and in deep sleep it is lost in its cause Avidyā. In this state too individuality persists because the Sākṣin is associated with Avidyā. In liberation, Avidyā is destroyed by jñāna and the Sākṣin is realized as the Brahman which it always is.

**Jīvanmukti**

Śrī Śankara repeatedly asserts that the Absolute can be realized through knowledge and knowledge alone; karma and upāsanā are subsidiary. They may help us in urging us to know reality and they may prepare us for that knowledge by purifying our mind (sattvashuddhi), but ultimately it is knowl-
edge alone which, by destroying ignorance, the root - cause of this world, can enable us to be one with the Absolute. The opposition of knowledge and action stands firm like a mountain. They are contradictory (viparīte) and are poles apart (dūramete.) Those who talk of combining knowledge with action, says Śaṅkara, have perhaps not read the Bṛhadāraṇyaka nor are they aware of the glaring contradiction repeatedly pointed out by the Shruti and the Smṛti. Knowledge and action are opposed like light and darkness. Actions are prescribed for those who are still in ignorance and not for those who are enlightened. Knowledge only remove ignorance and then reality shines forth by itself. A liberated sage, however, performs actions without any attachment and works for the uplift of humanity. Śaṅkara's own life bears ample witness to this fact.

**Vivartavāda** - Illusory modification of any substance, as of the rope in to the snake is called vivartha. Samkara's theory of creation is known as vivartavada.

**The other Schools of Vedanta**

The following are some of the well known Schools of Vedanta.

1. Śaṅkara - Advaita
2. Bhāskara - Bhedābheda
3. Yādavaprapāśa - Bhedābheda
4. Rāmānuja - Viśistādvaita
5. Madhva - Dvaita
7. Śrīkaṇṭha - Śaiva - Viśistādvaita
8. Sripati - Bhedābhedātmaka
9. Vallabha - Śuddhādvaita
10. Śuka - Bhedāvāda
11. Baladeva - Achintyabhedābheda

These schools are well known in India but Viśistādvaita Schools Rāmānuja and Dvaita Schools Madhva are more well known and gained precedence over the others.

**Viśistādvaitam**

The Viśistādvaita Schools was founded by Rāmānuja who wrote Śrīmad on Brahma Sūtra. Rāmānuja accepts the pūjārātr and śāktam Āgamas in addition to the Sūtras and Upaniṣads. According to this School the world is real, not an illusion. Souls and matter are many. They are the body of the Supreme being. The absolute is Viśiṣṭa or qualified by Cit and Acit says this School. The animate beings and the inanimate matter are all modes of the Supreme being. They exist only for him. Hence they are Śaṁ...
and the God is श्री। Viśistādvaita accepts that there are many Souls and objects which are mutually different. It is through Bhakti and Prapatti (devotion and Surrender) that the Īva ultimately attains the supreme self. Rāmānuja believes in the Pariṇāma vāda form of Satkārya Vāda

**Dvaita**

Ānanda Teertha or Madhvāchārya is the founder of Dvaita School of Vedanta. He wrote Prastānatraya Bhāṣyās and other independent works on Dvaita Philosophy. His Brahmasūtra bhāṣya is known as Aṇubhāṣya. He has also written commentary on Bhāgavatam. According to this school, matter, souls and God are all eternal and are different from each other. Bhakti is the means adopted by the followere of this School for obtaining the salvation through the grace of Vishnu (Hari) the Supreme Lord. According to Madhva, Brahman, identified with Viśṇu is the Supreme reality. Madhava proclaims the theory of Pañcabhedas between Jagat, Jeeva and Išwara.
MODULE III

Non Vedic Schools of Indian Philosophy
Charvāka, Baudha and Jaina Philosophies

Charvāka Philosophy

The School of Materialism in India seems to be very old. References are found to it in the epics and in the early Buddhist Literature. Bṛhaspati, a heretical teacher is regarded as the traditional founder of Charvāka school. His Śūtra, which we have no reason to doubt, has unfortunately perished. Sometimes this Bṛhaspati is equated with the teacher of the gods who propagated materialism among the Asuras so that they might be ruined. Charvāka, after whose name this school is so called, is said to be the chief disciple of Bṛhaspati. According to still another view, the word ‘Charvāka’ is not a proper name, but a common name given to a materialist, and it signifies a person who believes in ‘eat, drink and be merry’ (the root ‘charv’ means to eat), or a person who eats up his own words, or who eats up all moral and ethical considerations, or a person who is ‘sweet tongued’ (chāruvāk) and therefore whose doctrine is superficially attractive. Another synonym of Charvāka is Lokāyata which means a commoner and therefore, by implication, a man of low and unrefined taste. Nāstika-Shiromaṇi or an ‘arch-heretic’ is another name for a materialist. In Rāmāyaṇa, they are called ‘fools who think themselves to be wise and who are experts in leading people to doom and ruin’. References to them are also found in mahābhārata also. In majjima Nikāya, we find references to a reference to Ajitakeshakambalin, a materialist, probably so called because he must be having a blanket of hair with him, who believed only in preception and in four elements. Shāntarakṣita also refers to him as Kambalāśvatara (the man with a blanket and a mule).

No original work of this school is extant with the single exception of a much later work, Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāshi Bhāṭṭa, published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda in 1940. It is therefore very difficult to have a correct idea of it. Our chief sources of information are given in the works of the other schools. But this is done only to refute materialism. Thus we find the tenets of materialism often misrepresented. The weak points in this school are exaggerated and the strong points are omitted. So we get only a faint caricature and not a true picture. The Sarva-darshana-saṅgraha gives a summary of this school, but that too seems to be based on such accounts. It is indeed very difficult to believe that materialism which is allowed the status of an independent school of Indian Philosophy should really be so crude and degenerate as it is painted. But in the absence of the original works, we have to remain satisfied with these meagre and one-sided accounts.

sources

IN the second Act of the allegorical play called Prabodhachandrodaya, Kṛṣṇapati Mishra sums up the teaching of Materialism thus: ‘Lokāyata is the only Śūtra; perception is the only authority; earth, water, fire and air are the only elements; enjoyment is the only end of human existence; mind is only a product of matter. There is no other world: death means liberation.’ Some of the important Śūtras of Bṛhaspati which are quoted in the various philosophical writings may be gleaned as follows:
1) Earth, water fire and air are the elements.

\(\text{Pṛtuivaptejovāyurī tattvāni}\)

2) Bodies, senses and objects are the results of the different combination of elements.

\(\text{tatsamudāye sharīrendriyaviśayasamajñā.}\)

3) Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast (\text{Kīṇvādhībhvo madashaktivad vijñānam})

4) The soul is nothing but the conscious body

\(\text{Chaitanyavishistāḥ Puruṣāḥ}\)

5) Enjoyment is the only end of human life.

\(\text{Kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ}\)

6) Death alone is liberation.

\(\text{maraṇmevāpavargaḥ}\)

The Sarva-darshana-saṅgraha gives the following summary of the Chārvāka position:

'There is not heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world; nor do the action of the four castes, orders etc, produce any real effect. The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves and smearing one's self with ashes, were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness. If a beast slain in the Jyoṭiṣṭoma rite will itself go to heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?... If beings in heaven are gratified by out offering the Shrāddha here, then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the house top? While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee (clarified butter) even though he runs in debt; when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return here?...(All the ceremonies are) a means of livelihood (for) Brāhmaṇas. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons'.

**EPISTEMOLOGY**

**Perception (The only Source of Knowledge)**

Knowledge of reality or valid cognition is called pramāṇa and the source of such knowledge is called pramāṇa. The Cārvāka holds that perception is the only pramāṇa or dependable source of knowledge. For establishing this position he criticizes the possibility of other sources of knowledge like inference and testimony which are regarded as valid pramāṇas by many philosophers.

**Critique of Anumāṇa**

If inference is to be regarded as a Pramāṇa it must yield knowledge about which we can have no doubt and which must be true to reality. But inference cannot fulfil these conditions, because when we infer, for example, the existence of the fire in a mountain from the perception of smoke in it, we take a leap in the dark, from the perceive smoke to the unperceived fire. A logician, like the Naiyāyika, will
perhaps point out that such a leap is justified by the previous knowledge of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire and that the inference stated more fully would be: All cases of smoke are cases of fire, this (mountain) is a case of smoke, therefore, this is a case of fire.

The Cārvāka points out that this contention would be acceptable only if the major premise, stating the invariable relation between the middle term (smoke) and the major (fire), were beyond doubt. But this invariable relation (Vyāpti) can be established only if we have a knowledge of all cases of smoke and fire existing now is different parts of the world, to speak nothing of those which existed in the past or will exist in the future. No invariable, universal relation (Vyāpti) can, therefore, be established by perception. Neither can it be said to be based on another inference, because it will involve a petitio principal, since the validity of that inference again has to be similarly proved. Nor can this Vyāpti be based in the testimony (śabda) if reliable persons (who state that all cases of smoke are cases of fire), For, the validity of testimony itself requires to be proved by inference. Besides, of inference always depended on testimony, no one could infer anything by himself.

Therefore it becomes proved that inference can not be regarded as valid source of knowledge.

**Critique of śabda**

But can we not regard the testimony of competent persons as a valid and safe source of knowledge? Do we not very often act on knowledge received from authority? The Cārvāka replies that testimony consists of words (śabda). So far as words are heard through our ears, they are perceived. Knowledge of words is, therefore, knowledge through perception and is quite valid. But in so far as these words suggest or mean things not within our perception, and aim at giving us knowledge of those unperceived objects, they are not free from error and doubt. Very often we are misled by so - called authority. The authority of the Vedas, for example, is held in high esteem by many. But in reality the Vedas are the works of some cunning priests who earned their living by duping the ignorant and the credulous. With false hopes and promises the Vedas persuade men to perform Vedic rites, the only tangible benefit of which goes to the priests who officiate and enjoy the emoluments.

But will not our knowledge to extremely limited and practical life sometimes impossible, if we do not accept the words of the experienced and do not depend on expert advice? The Cārvāka reply is that in so far as we depend on any authority, because we think it to be reliable, the knowledge obtained is really based on inference; because our belief is generated by a mental process like this: This authority should be accepted because it is reliable, and all reliable authority should be accepted. Being based on inference, knowledge, derived from verbal testimony or authority is as precarious as inference. And as in the case of inference, so here we often act on knowledge derived from authority on the wrong belief that it is reliable. Sometimes this belief accidentally leads to successful results, sometimes it does not. Therefore, authority or testimony cannot be regarded as a safe and valid source of knowledge.
As neither inference nor authority can be proved to be reliable, Perception must be regarded as the only valid source of knowledge (pramāṇa).

**Rejection of Non-material Elements**

If perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, we can rationally assert only the reality of perceptible objects. God, Soul, heaven, life before birth or after death, and any unperceived law (like adṛṣṭa) cannot be believed in, because they are all beyond perception. Material objects are the only object whose existence can be received and whose reality can be asserted. The Cārvākas, thus, come to establish materialism or the theory that matter is the only reality.

Regarding the nature of the material world most other Indian thinkers hold that it is composed of five kinds of elements (pañcabhūta), namely, ether (ākāśa), air (vāyu), fire (agni), water (ap) and earth (Kṣīti). But the Cārvākas reject ether, because its existence cannot be perceived; it has to be inferred. The Material world is, therefore, held to be composed of the four perceptible elements. Not only non-living material objects but also living organisms, like plants and animal bodies, are composed of these four elements.

**Rejection of Soul**

The Cārvākas admit that the existence of consciousness is proved by perception. But they deny that consciousness is the quality of any unperceived non-material or spiritual entity. As consciousness is perceived to exist in the perceptible living body composed of the material elements, it must be a quality of this body itself. What people mena by a soul in nothing more that this conscious living body (caitanyaviśiṣṭa deha eva ātmā). The non-material soul is never perceived. On the contrary, we have direct evidence of the identity of the self with the body in our daily experiences and judgments like, ‘I am fat’, ‘I am lame’, ‘I am blind’. If the ‘I’, the self, were different from the body, these would be meaningless.

But the objection may be raised: We do not perceive consciousness in any of the four material elements. How can it then come to quality their product, the body? In reply the Cārvāka points out that qualities not present originally in any of the component factors may emerge subsequently when the factors are combined together. For example, betel leaf, lime and nut, none of which is originally red, come to acquire a reddish tinge when chewed together. Or, even the same thing placed under a different condition becomes intoxicant when allowed to ferment. In a similar way it is possible to think that the material elements combined in a particular way give rise to the conscious living body. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon or bye product of matter, there is no evidence of its existence independent of the body.

If the existence of a soul apart from the body is not proved, there is no possibility of proving its immortality. On the contrary, death of the body means the end of the individual. All questions about previous life, after-life, rebirth, enjoyment of the fruits of actions in heaven or hell, therefore, become meaningless.
Rejection of God

God, whose existence cannot be perceived, fares no better than the soul. The material elements produce the words, and the suppuration of a creator is unnecessary. The objection may be raised: Can the material elements by themselves give rise to this wonderful world? We find that even the production of an object like an earthen jar requires, in addition to clay which is its material cause, a potter who is the efficient cause, the shapes the material into the desired form. The four elements supply only the material cause of the world. Do we not require and efficient cause, like God as the shaper and designer who turns the materials elements into this wonderful world? In reply, the Cārvāka states that the material elements themselves have got each its fixed nature (svabhāva). It is by the natures and laws inherent in them that they combine together to form this world. There is thus no necessity for God. There is no proof that the objects of the world as the products of any design. They can be explained more reasonably as the fortuitous products of the elements. The Cārvākas, therefore, prefer atheism.

In so far as this Cārvāka theory tries to explain the world only by nature, it is sometimes called naturalism (svabhāva - vāda). It is also called mechanism (yadṛcchā - vāda), because it denies the existence of conscious purpose behind the world and explains it as a mere mechanical or fortuitous combination of elements. The Cāṛcāva theory on the whole may also be called positivism, because it believes only in positive facts or observable phenomena.

Rejection of Dharma and Mokṣa

Some Indian Philosophers like the Mīmāṃsakas believe that the highest of human life is heaven (svarga) which is a state of unalloyed bliss and can be attained hereafter by performing here the Vedic rites. The Cārvāka rejection the view, because it is based in the unproved existence of a life after death. 'Heaven' and 'hell' are the inventions of the priests whose professional; interest lies in coaxing, threatening and making people perform the rituals. Enlightened men will always refuse to be duper by them.

Many other philosophers regard liberation as the highest goal of human life. Liberation, again, is conceived as the total destruction of all sufferings. Some think that it can be attained only after death, when the soul is free from the body; and others believe that is can be attained even in this life. But the Cārvāka holds that none of these views stands to reason. If liberation is freedom of the soul from its bondage to physical existence, it is absurd because there is no soul. But if liberation means the attainment of a state free from all pain, in this very life, it is also an impossible ideal. Existence in this body is bound up with pleasure as well as pain. We can only try to minimise pain and enjoy as much pleasure as we can. Liberation in the sense of complete cessation of sufferings can only mean death. Those who try to attain in life a state free from pleasures and pains by rigorously suppressing the natural appetites, thinking that all pleasures arising out of their gratification are mixed with pain, act like fools. For no wise man would 'reject the kernel because of its husk', nor 'give up eating fish because there are bones', nor 'cease to grow crops because there are animals to destroy them', nor 'stop cooking his food because beggars might ask
for a share’. If we remember that our existence is confined to the existence of the body and to this life, we must regard the pleasure arising in the body as the only good thing we can obtain. We should not throw away the opportunities of enjoying this life in the futile hope of enjoyment hereafter. ‘Rather a pigeon today than a peacock tomorrow’. ‘A sure shell (courie) is better than a doubtful golden coin’. ‘Who is that fool who would entrust the money in hand the custody of others?’ The goal of human life is, therefore, to attain the maximum amount of pleasure in this life, avoiding pain as far as possible. A good life is a life of maximum enjoyment. A good action is one which leads to a balance of pleasure and a bad action is one which brings about more pain than pleasure.

**Jaina Philosophy**

**Introduction**

The Word Jainism is derived from 'Jina' which means 'conqueror' one who has conquered his passions and desires. It is applied to the liberated souls who have conquered passions and desires and karmas and obtained emancipation. The Jainas believe in 24 Tīrthaṅkaras or 'Founders of the Faith' through whom their faith has come down from fabulous antiquity. Of these, the first was Rṣabhaveda and the last, Mahāvīra, the great spiritual hero, whose name was Vardhamāna. Mahāvīra, the last of the prophets, cannot be regarded as the founder of Jainism, because even before him, Jaina teachings were existent. But Mahāvīra gave a new orientation to that faith and for all practical purposes, modern Jainism may be rightly regarded as a result of his teachings. He flourished in the sixth century B.C. and was a contemporary of the Buddha. His predecessor, the 3rd Tīrthaṅkara, Pārshvanātha is also a historical personage who lived in the eighth or ninth century B.C.

**Knowledge**

The Jainas classify knowledge into immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (parokṣa). Immediate knowledge is further divided into Avadhi, Manaḥparyāya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into Mati and Śrūtra. Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate, is admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate and not immediate knowledge. It is included under Mati. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge therefore is regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mati includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. Śrūtra means knowledge derived from authority. Thus Mati and Śrūtra which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instruments perception, inference an authority, the three Pramāṇas admitted by Jainism. Avadhi-jñāna, Manaḥ- paryāya - jñāna and Kevala - jñāna, are the three kinds of immediate. Knowledge which may be called extra- ordinary and extra-sensory perceptions. Avadhi is clairvoyance; Manaḥparyaya is telepathy; and Kevala is omniscience. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space or time. It is called Avadhi or 'limited' because it functions within a
particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spatial and temporal limits. Manaḥ-
paryāya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. This too is limited by spatial and temporal conditions. In both Avadhi and Manaḥparyāya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. Kevala - Jñāna is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by the liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object. Besides these five kinds of right knowledge, we have three kinds of wrong knowledge - Samshaya or doubt, Viparyaya or mistake and Anadhyavasāya or wrong knowledge through indifference.

**Sat (Concept of Reality)**

The jaina metaphysics is realistic. It gives the doctrine of the monyness reality. There are innumerable material atoms and innumerable souls which are all separately and independently real. That is why jaina metaphysics is known as pluralistic realism. There are innumerable real substances which are kept under two categories, Jiva and Ajiva. Now we shall discuss these realities one by one.

**Druya (substance)**

The Jainas do not hold that being is permanent, without becoming, change and end. Everything is produced, continues and is again destroyed. The definition of substance depends on our standpoint. It is that which always exists, as the universe, which has no beginning or end. It is the subject of qualities and modifications. Anything which has origin, existence and destruction is a substance. The whole universe is brought under the two everlasting, uncreated, eternal and co-existing categories which are called Jiva and Ajiva. Jiva means the conscious spirit and Ajiva means the unconscious non-spirit. Ajiva includes not only matter which is called 'pudgala', but also space, motion, rest and time. Spirit matter motion, rest and space (respectively called jiva, pudgala, dharma, adharma and ākāśha) are described as Asti - kāya dravyas or substances which possess constituent parts extending in space; while time (kāla) is the only anasati-kāya dravya which has no extension in space.

**Guṇa (Quality)**

Qualities or guṇas inhere in substances as materiality in atoms, and they cannot exist by themselves. The chief qualities are: (1) Existence, (2) Enjoyability, (3) Substantoveness, (4) Knowablity, (5) Specific character or identity or essence, (6) the quality of possessing some kind of form. These general qualities are common to dravyas, and each of the latter has also its own specific features. We should not abstract any of these qualities and exalt it to a substantive level. Yet "there is neither quality without sustance nor substance without quality". A thing exists in and through the qualities and the qualities constitute the thing. The difference is one reference and not existence. "If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances, or again, if the qualities can exist separate from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all."
Paryaya (Mode)

The Dravya with the qualities must exist in some form or state. This mode of existence is paryāya and is subject to change. The Substance gold with its qualities of malleability and yellowness is not subject to change. The guṇas or qualities continue while the paryāyas or forms change. There are two kinds of paryāyas or modifications (1) Modifications of the essential qualities of a thing of or substance. The colour of water may change, through colour is a constant property. (2) Modifications of the accidental qualities such as muddiness. Water need not always be muddy.

Jiva (Animate substance)

Jiva is generally the same as the Ātman or the Puruṣa in other pluralistic schools with this important difference that it is identified with life of which consciousness in said to be the essence. The Jivas are divided first into those who are liberated (mukta) and those who are bound (baddha). The bound souls are further divided into mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara). The latter live in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air and in the vegetable kingdom and have only one sense - that of touch. The mobile souls are again classified as those who have two senses (e.g. worms), three senses (e.g. ants), four senseda (e.g. wasps, bees etc.) and five senses (e.g. higher animals and men).

Consciousness is regarded as the essence of the soul (chetālakṣaṇo jīvaḥ) Every soul from the lowest to the highest possesses consciousness. The degrees of consciousness any vary according to the obstacles of karma. The lowest souls which inhabit material atoms appear to be lifeless and unconscious, but in fact life and consciousness are present in them though in a dormant form, purest consciousness is found in the emancipated souls where there is no shred of Karma. All souls are really alike. The degrees of consciousness are due merely to the karma - obstacle. The soul in its intrinsic nature possesses Infinite Faith, Infinite Knowledge, Infinite Bliss and Infinite Power. In the case of the bound souls these characteristics are obscured by karma. A jiva is a real knower (jñātā), a real agent (karta) and a real experient (bhokta). It is included in the astikāya dravyas because its constituents possess extension in space. But it does not extent in space like matter. It is like the light. Just as the light fills the space where it is burning many lights may remain in the same place without coming into conflict with one another, similarly the soul fills the space and many souls may remain together without any conflict. Though itself formless, it takes the form of the body which it illuminates. The soul of an ant is as big as the body of it and the soul of an elephant is as big as the elephant itself. The soul is coextensive with the body. Though we find souls in this world as embodies and as possessing the senses and the manas which help the souls to know, yet really the body, the senses and the manas are obstructions placed by karma and hinder the souls in their direct knowledge. Knowledge is not a property of the soul; it is its very essence. Every soul, therefore, can directly and immediately know everything if it is not obstructed by matter. Freedom from matter means omniscience and emancipation.
Ajiva (Inanimate substance)

The category of Ajiva is divided into matter (pudgala), space (ākāsha), motion (dharma), rest (adharma) and time (kāla). They are all without life and consciousness. Time is anastikāya because it does not extent in space. It is infinite. It is not perceived, but inferred from its characteristics which make possible continuity (vartanā), modification (pariṇāma), activity (kriyā), 'now' or 'new' (paratva), and 'then' or 'old' (aparatva). It is one and indivisible. Some jaina writers have distinguished between real (pāramārthika) and empirical (vyāvahārika) time. The former makes continuity or duration possible and is infinite, one and indivisible. The latter can be divided into moments, hours, days, months and years and makes other changes, except duration, possible.

Like time, space is also infinite, eternal and imperceptible. It is inferred as the condition of extension. All substances except time have extension and extension is afforded only by space. Space itself is not extension; it is the locus of extension. Two kinds of space are distinguished. In one, motion is possible and it is called Lokākāśa or filled space; in the other, motion is not possible and it is called Alokākāśa or empty space. The former contains all the words where life and movement are; the latter stretches itself infinitely beyond the former. At the summit of Lokākāśa is Siddhashilā, the Adobe of the Liberated Souls.

Dharma and Adharma are used here not in their popular sense of merit and demerit, but in the technical sense of the conditions of movement and rest. Like space and time, these also are eternal and imperceptible. They are inferred as the conditions which help motion and rest respectively. They are formless and passive. Dharma cannot generate motion nor can Adharma arrest it. They only help or favour motion or rest, like water helping the motion of a fish or like earth supporting things which rest on it.

Matter is called Pudgala which means that which is liable to integration and disintegration (pūrayanti galani cha). This word is used in Buddhism in the sense of a soul, while in Jainism it is used for matter. An atom (aṇu) is supposed to be the smallest part of matter which cannot be further divided. Compound objects (saṅghāta or skandha) of the material world including senses, mind (manas) and breath are the combinations of atoms. Matter possesses the four qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. Sound is regarded not as a quality, as other systems have done, but only as modification (pariṇāma) of matter. These atoms are supposed to house the souls. Like the ancient Greek atomists Democritus and Leucippus and unlike the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the Jainas do not maintain any qualitative difference in the atoms. All atoms are qualitatively alike and indistinguishable. They become differentiated by developing the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch. Hence the distinction of the elements of earth, water, fire and air is secondary and transmutation of elements is quite possible. Matter in its subtle form constitutes Karma which infiltrates into the souls and binds them to samsāra.
Theory of Knowledge

The Jainas classify knowledge into immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (paroṣa). Immediate knowledge is further divided into Avadhi, Manahparyāya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into Mati and Shruta. Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate, is admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate and not immediate knowledge. It is including under Mati. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge therefore is regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mati includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge, Shruta means knowledge derived from authority. Thus Mati and Śhruta which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instruments perception, inference and authority, the three Pramāṇas admitted by Jainism. Avadhi-ज्ञान, Manahparyāya - ज्ञान and Kevala -ज्ञान, are the three kinds of immediate knowledge which may be called extra - ordinary and extra - sensory perceptions. Avadhi is clairvoyance; Manahparyāya is telepathy; and Kevala is omniscience. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at distance of space or time. It is called Avadhi or 'limited' because it functions within a particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spatial and temporal limits. Manaह - paryāya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. This too is limited by spatial and temporal conditions. In both Avadhi and Manahparyāya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. Kevala - ज्ञान is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by the liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object.

Besides these five kinds of right knowledge, we have three kinds of wrong knowledge Samśaya or doubt, Viparyāya or mistake and Anadhyavasāya or wrong knowledge through indifference.

Knowledge may again be divided into two kinds, namely, Pramāṇa or Knowledge of a thing as it is and Naya or knowledge of a thing in its relation. Jaina accepts three pramaṇa - Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and śabda.

Nayavāda

Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called 'naya'. Judgment based on this partial knowledge is also included in 'naya'.

There are seven 'Nayas' of which the first four are called 'Artha - naya' because they relate to objects or meanings, and the last three are called 'Śaba-naya' because they relate to words. When taken as absolute, a 'naya' becomes a fallacy - 'nayābhasa'.

The first is the 'Naigama -naya'. From this standpoint we look at a thing as having both universal and particular qualities and we do not distinguish between them. It becomes fallacious when both universals and particulars are regarded as separately real absolute, The second is the 'Saṅgraha - naya'. Here we
emphasize the universals qualities and ignore the particulars Where they are manifested. It becomes fallacious when universal alone are treated as absolutely real and particulars are rejects. The third is the 'Vyavahāra-naya' which is the conventional point of view based on empirical knowledge. Here things are taken as concrete particulars and their specific features are emphasized. It becomes fallacious when particulars alone are viewed as real and universals are rejected as unreal. The fourth is called 'Rjusūtra-naya'. Here the real is identified with the momentary. The particulars are reduced to a series of moments and any given moment is regarded as real. When this partial truth is mistaken to be the whole truth, it becomes fallacious. Among the nayas which refer to words, the first is called 'Śhābda-naya'. It means that a word is necessarily related to the meaning which it signifies. Every word refers either to a thing or quality or relation or action. The second is 'Samabhīrūḍha -naya' which distinguishes terms according to their roots. For example, the word 'Paṇkaja' literally menas 'born of mud' and signifies any creature or plant born of mud, but its meaning has been conventionally restricted to 'lotus' only. Similarly the word 'gauḷ' means 'any thing which moves', but has conventionally becomes restricted to signify only a 'cow'. The third is called 'Evambhītā-naya' which is a specialized form of the second. According to it, a name should be applied to an object only when its meaning is fulfilled. For examples, a cow should be called 'gauḷ' only when it moves and not when it is lying down.

Each naya or point of view represents only one of the innumerable aspects possessed by a thing from which we may attempt to know or describe it. When any such partial viewpoint is mistaken for the whole truth, we have a 'nayābhāsa' or a fallacy. The 'nayas' are also distinguished as 'Dravyārthika' or from the point of view of substance which takes into account the permanent nature and unity of things, and as 'Paryātikā' or from the point of view of modes which takes into account the passing modifications and the diversity of things. When a thing is taken to be either as permanent only or as momentary only, either as one only or as many only, fallacies arise.

**Syādvāda**

Syādvāda holds all knowledge to be only probable. Every proposition given us only a perhaps, a may be or a syād. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object. There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness. It does not deny the possibility of predication, though it disallows absolute or categorical predication. The dynamic character of reality can consist only with relative or conditional predication. Every proposition is true, but only under certain condition. i.e. hypothetically.

It holds that there are seven different ways of speaking of thing or its attributes, according to the point of view. There is a point of view from which substance or attribute (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is and is not, (4) is unpredictable, (5) is and is unpredictable, (6) is not and is unpredictable, and (7) is, is not and is unpredictable.
1. Syād asti. From the point of view of its own material, place, time and nature, a thing is, i.e. exists as itself. The jar exists as made of clay, in my room at the present moments, of such and such a shape and size.

2. Syād nāsti. From the point of view of the material, place, time and nature of another thing, a thing is not, i.e, it is not nothing. The jar does not exist as made of metal, at a different place or time or if a different shape and size.

3. Syād asti nāsti. From the point of view of the same quaternary, relating to itself and another thing, it may be said that a thing is and is not. In a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain sense it does not. We say here what a thing is as well as what it is not.

4. Syād avaktavyam. While in three we make statements that a thing is in its own self and is not, as another successively, it becomes impossible to make these statements at once. In this sense a thing is unpredicable. Though the presence of its own nature and the absence of other - nature are both together in the jar, still we cannot express them.

5. Syād asti a avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own quaternary and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is and is unpredicable. We note both the existence of a thing and its indescribability.

6. Syād nāsti avaktavyam. From the point of view of the quaternary of the nothing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is not and is also unpredicable. We note here what thing is not as well as its indescribability.

7. Syād asti nāsti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own quaternary as well as that of nothing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is, is not and is indescribable. We bring out the inexpressibly of a thing as well as it is and what it is not.

Of these possible ways of speaking about a thing or its attributes, the first two are the chief, the simple affirmative that a thing is in its svarupa (own form), svadravya (ownmatter), svakṣ svetra (own place), and svakāla (own time), and the simple negative that a thing is not in its pararūpa (other form), paradravya (other matter), parakṣetra (other place), and parakāla (other time). The latter is the negative fact. This doctrine insists on the correlativity of affirmation and negation. All judgements are doubleedged in their character. All things are existent as well as nonexostent. This is the theory of syādavāda given by jaina.

Anekāntavāda

The Jaina metaphysics is a realistic and relativistic pluralism. It is called Anekāntavāda or the doctrine of the manyness of reality. Matter (pudgala) and spirit (jiva) are regarded as separate and independent realities. There are innumerable material atoms and innumerable individual souls which are all separately and independently real. And each atom and each soul possesses innumerable aspects of its
A thing has got an infinite number of characteristics of its own. Every object possesses innumerable positive and negative characters. It is not possible for us, ordinary people, to know all the qualities of a thing. We can know only some qualities of some things. To know all the aspects of a thing is to become omniscient. Therefore the Jainas say that he who knows all the qualities of one thing, knows all the qualities of all things, and he who knows all the qualities of all things, knows all the qualities of one thing. Human knowledge is necessarily relative and limited and so are all our judgments. This epistemological and logical theory of the Jainas is called 'Syādvāda'. As a matter of fact, both anekāntavāda and Syādvāda are the two aspects of the same teaching - realistic and relativistic pluralism. They are like the two sides of the same coin. The metaphysical side that reality has innumerable characters is called Anekāntavāda, while the epistemological and logical side that we can know only some aspects of reality and that therefore all our judgments are necessarily relative, is called Syādvāda.

A thing has many characters and it exists independently. It is called substance (dravya). It persists in and through all attributes and modes. Substance is defined as that which possesses qualities and modes. Out of these innumerable qualities of a substance, some are permanent and essential, while others are changing and accidental. The former are called attributes (guṇa) and the latter modes (paryāya). Substance and attributes are inseparable because the latter are the permanent essence of the substance and cannot remain without it. Modes or modifications are changing and accidental. Reality is a unity and - difference or difference - and -unity. Viewed from the point of view of substance, a thing is one and permanent and real; viewed from the point of view of modes, it is many and momentary and unreal. Substance, therefore, is also defined as that which possesses the three characteristics of production, destruction and permanence. Substance has its unchanging essence and therefore is permanent. But it also has its changing modes and therefore is subject to origination and decay. To mistake any one-sided and partial view as the whole truth is to commit the fallacy of Ekāntavāda. As Jainism takes into account all these partial views, it is calls Anekāntavāda.

**Bondage and Liberation**

Karma is the link which unites the soul to the body, Ignorance of truth and four passions anger (krodha), greed (lobha), pride (māna) and delusion (māyā) which are called kaṣāya or sticky substances where karmic particles stick, attract the flow of karmic matter towards the soul. The state when karmic particles actually begin to flow towards the soul to bind it is called Āsrava or flow. The state when these particles actually infiltrate into the soul and bind it is called Buddha or bondage. The ideal bondage (bhāva-bandha) of the soul takes place as soon as it has bad disposition and the material bondage (dravya-bandha) takes place when there is actual influx of karma into the soul. In bondage, the karmic matter unites with the soul by intimate interpenetration, just as water unites with milk or fire unites with the red-hot iron ball. It is for this reason that we find life and consciousness in every part of the body. By the possession and practice of right faith, knowledge and conduct, the influx of fresh karma is stopped. This
state is called samvara or stoppage. Then, the already existing karma must be exhausted. This state is called nirjarā or wearing out. When the last particle of karma has been exhausted 'the partnership between soul and matter is dissolved'. and the soul shines in its intrinsic nature of infinite faith, knowledge, bliss and power. This state is called Mokṣa or liberation. Here Kevala jñāna or omniscience is attained. The liberated soul transcends samsāra and goes straight to siddha-shilā at the top of the world and dwells there in eternal knowledge and bliss. Bondage, therefore, means union of the soul with and consequently liberation means separation of matter from the soul. We, conscious living souls, find ourselves bound to karmic matter and the end of our life is to remove this karmic dross and regain our intrinsic nature. Hence Jainism is primarily and ethical teaching and its aim is the perfection of the soul. Āsrava or the flow of matter towards the soul is the cause of bondage and Samvara or the stoppage of his flow is the cause of liberation. Everything else in Jainism is said to be elaboration of this fundamental teaching. These five states together with the Jiva and the Ajiva make the seven principles if Jainism. Sometimes virtue (puṇya) and vice (pāpa) are added to these seven to make up the nine categories of Jainism.

Passions attract the flow of karmic matter into the souls. And passions are due to ignorance. So ignorance is the real cause of bondage. Now, ignorance can be removed only by knowledge. So right knowledge is the cause of liberation. This right knowledge is produced by faith in the teachings of the omniscient Tīrthaṅkaras. Hence faith is necessary. And it is right conduct which perfects knowledge since theory without practice is empty and practice without theory is blind. Right knowledge dawns when all the karmas are destroyed by right conduct. Hence right faith. Right conduct and right knowledge all the three together form the path of liberation which is the joint effect of these three. Right faith (samyak darśana), knowledge (jñāna) and conduct (chāritra) are the three Jewels (tri-ratna) of Jainism. They are inseparably bound up and perfection of one goes with the perfection of the other two.

**Buddhism**

It was in the sixth century B.C. that the world saw the Light of Asia, that perfect embodiment of knowledge, courage, love and sacrifice whose heart overflowed with purest emotion on seeing that human life was essentially fraught with misery and pain, that a shallow optimism was rooted in a deep pessimism, that behind the superficial momentary glow of sensual pleasure there lay the misery of old age, sickness and death; who, moved by that spectacle to seek a remedy for men's ills, at the age of twenty-nine, boldly left not only the material luxuries of the Shākya kingdom but also his beloved wife, beloved new-born son, at last found enlightenment as he lay emaciated under a tree near Gaya, dispelling the dark clouds of ignorance and conquering Māra, the Prince of Evil; who then preached the truth he had discovered without distinction of caste, creed or colour. Thus Buddha taught. And Buddhism was embraced by the rich and poor, the high and the low, the intellectual and the dull alike.
Literature

Buddhism is divided into many philosophical school and has a vast literature. The teachings of Buddha were oral and were recorded much later by his disciples. Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher and social reformer than a theoretical philosopher. He referred to a number of metaphysical views prevalent in his times and condemned them as futile. Whenever metaphysical questions were put to him, he avoided them saying that they were neither profitable nor conductive to the highest good. 'Philosophy purifies none, peace alone does'.

Buddha’s Philosophical teachings and conversations were compiled in the ‘Tipiṭaka’ or the Three Baskets. The first Basket is the Vinaya -Piṭaka which the discipline of the Order. The second is the Sutta-Piṭaka which is said to be a compilation of the utterance of the Master himself and consists of five collections called Nikāyas - Dīgha, Majjhima, Anguttara, Samyutta and khuddaka. The third is called Abhidhamma- Piṭaka which deals with philosophical discussions. Besides these, these is a vast non-canonical Pāli literature including Milinda- Pañho, Dīpavamsa, Mahāvamsa, Visuddhi-magga and rich commentary literature of the Tipiṭaka.

Teachings of the Buddha

Four Noble Truths

The Four Noble Truths (Ārya satya) are:-

1) There is suffering (duḥkha): Life is full of misery and Pain. Even the so-called pleasures are really fraught with pain. There is always fear lest we may lose the so-called pleasures and their loss involves pain. Indulgence also results in pain. That there is suffering in this world is a fact of common experience. Poverty, disease, old age, death, selfishness, meanness, greed, anger, hatred, quarrels, bickering, conflicts, exploitation are rampant in this world. That life is full of suffering none can deny.

2) There is a cause of suffering (duḥkha-samudāya): Everything has a cause. Nothing comes out of nothing - ex nihilo nihilfit. The existence of every event depends open its causes and conditions. Everything in this world is conditional, relative, limited. Suffering being a fact, it must have a cause. It must depend on some conditions. This being, that arises, 'the cause being present, the effect arises', is the causal law of Dependent Origination.

3) There is a cessation of suffering (duḥkha-norodha): Because everything arises depending on some causes and conditions, therefore if these causes and conditions are removed the effect must also cease. The cause being removed, the effect ceases to exist. Everything being conditional and relative is necessarily momentary and what is momentary must perish. That which is born must die. Production implies destruction.

4) There is a way leading to this cessation of suffering (duḥkha-nirodha-gāmini pratipat): There is an ethical and spiritual path by following which misery may by removed and liberation attained. This is the Noble Eight-fold path.
Aṣṭāṅgamārga (Eight-fold path)

The Noble Eight-fold path consists of eight steps which are: (1) Right faith (samyag drṣṭī), (2) right resolve (saṅkalpa), (3) right speech (vāk), (4) right action (karmānta), (5) right living (ājīva), (6) right effort (vyāyāma), (7) right thought (smṛti) and (8) right concentration (samādhi). This is open to the clergy and the laity alike. Samyag drṣṭī, the first step of eight fold path, is right knowledge of the four noble truths. Samyag saṅkalpa means firm determination to reform life in the light of truth Samyag Vāka is right control over speech. Samyag karmānta means abstension from wrong action. Samyag ājīva teaches to maintain life by honest means. ‘Constant endeavour to maintain moral progress by banishing evil thoughts and entertaining good ones is known as samyag vyāyāma. Constant remembrance of the perishable nature of thing is samyag smṛti. And samyag samādhi, the last one, is right concentration through four stages of intent meditation, unruffled meditation, detachment from main things-Śila, Samādhi and Prajñā.

Madhyama Pratipada

Buddha’s ethical ‘middle path’ is like the ‘golden mean’ of Aristotle. Self-indulgence and self mortification are equally ruled out. In his very first Sermon at Sārānātha he said: ‘There are two extremes, O monks from which he who leads a religious life must abstain. One is a life of pleasure, devoted to desire and enjoyment: that is base, ignoble, unspiritual, unworthy, unreal. The perfect One, O monks, is removed from both these extremes and has discovered the way which lies between them, the middle way which enlightens the eyes. enlightens the mind, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa’.

Madhyam Pratipada is the theory which avoids both eternalatism and nihilism both and find a middle way between them.

Pratiyasamutpāda

The doctrine of Pratityasamutpāda or Dependent Origination is the foundation of all the teachings of the Buddha. It is contained in the Second Noble Truth which gives us the cause of suffering, and in the Third Noble Truth which shows the cessation of suffering. Suffering in Samsāra; cessation of suffering is Nirvāṇa. Both are only aspects of the same Reality. Pratityasamutpāda, viewed from the point of view of relativity is Samsāra; while viewed from the point of view of reality, it is Nirvāṇa. It is relativity and dependent causation as well as the Absolute, for it is the Absolute itself which appears as relative and acts as the binding thread giving then unity and meaning. everything is relative, conditional, dependent, subject to birth and death and therefore impermanent. The causal formula is ‘This being, that arises’, i.e., ‘Depending on the cause, the effect arises’. Thus every object of thought in necessarily relative, And because it is relative, it is neither absolutely real (for it is subject to death) nor absolutely unreal (for it appears to arise). All Phenomenal things hang between reality and nothingness, avoiding both the extremes,
They are like the appearances of the Vedāntic Avidyā or Māyā. It is in this sense that Buddha calls the doctrine the Middle Path, Madhyamā Pratipat, which avoids both eternalism and nihilism. Buddha identifies it with the Bodhi, the Enlightenment which dawned upon him under the shade of the bo tree in Gaya and which trasformed the mortal Siddhārta into the immortal Buddha. He also identifies it with the Dharma, the Law: ‘He who sees the pratityasamutpāda sees the Dharma, and he who sees the Dharma sees Pratityasamutpāda’. Failure to grasp it is the cause of misery. Its knowledge leads to cessation of misery Nāgārjuna salutes Buddha as the best among the teachers, who taught the blessed doctrine of Pratityasamutpāda which leads to the cessation of Plurality and to bliss. Shāntarakṣita also does the same.

The twelve chain of dependent origination is given below.

1) Ignorance (avidyā)
2) Impressions of Karmic forces (samskāra)
3) Initial consciousness of the embryo (vijñāna)
4) Psycho-physical organism (nāma - rūpa)
5) Six sense - organs including mind (ṣaḍāyatana)
6) Sense - object - contact (śparśha)
7) Sense - experience (vedanā)
8) Thirst for sense - enjoyment (ṛṣṭṇā)
9) Clinging to this enjoyment (upādāna)
10) Will to be born (bhava)
11) Birth or rebirth (jāti)
12) Old age and death (jarā - maraṇa)

Out of these twelve links the first two are related to past life, the last two to future life and the rest to present life. This is the cycle of birth - and death. This is the twelve-spoked wheel of Dependent Origination. This is the vicious circle of causation. It does not end with death. Death is only a beginning of a new life. It is called Bhava-chakra, Samsāra-chakra, Janma-maraṇa-chakra, Dharma-chakra, Pratityasamutpāda chakra etc.

**Nirvāṇa**

Troubled by the sight of disease, old age and death, Buddha left his home to find a solution of the misery of earthly life. Pratityasamutpāda is the solution which he found. Why do we suffer misery and pain? Why do we suffer old age and death? Because we are born. Why are we born? Because their is a will to be born. Why should there be this will to become? Because we cling to the objects of the world.
Why do we have this clinging? Because we crave to enjoy the objects of this world. Why do we have this craving, this thirst for enjoyment? Because of sense experience. Why do we have this sense experience? Because of sense-object-contact. Why do we have this contract? Because of the six sense organs (the sixth sense being the mind). Why do we have the six sense organs? Because of the psychophysical organism. Why do we have this organism? Because of the initial consciousness of the embryo why do we have this consciousness? Because of our predispositions or impressions of Karma. Why do we have these impressions? Because of Ignorance. Hence Ignorance is the root-cause of all suffering.

In the old books we also find mention of a triple path consisting of Shila or right conduct, Samādhi or right concentration and Prajñā and Charitra of Jainism. Shila and Samādhi lead to Prajñā which is the direct cause of liberation. Hence, perfect wisdom, perfect goodness and perfect equanimity complete relief from suffering - are simultaneously attained, therefore, in Nirvāṇa.

Kṣanabhāngavāda

The doctrine of dependent origination also yields the Buddhist theory of the transitory nature of things. All things, Buddha repeatedly teaches, are subject to change and decay. As everything originates from some condition, it disappears when the condition ceases to be. Whatever has a beginning has also an end. Buddha, therefore, says, "know that whatever exists arises from causes and condition and is in every respect impermanent". "That which seems everlasting will perish, that which is high will be laid low; where meeting is, parting will be; where birth is, death will come".

Transitoriness of life and worldly things is spoken of by many other poets and philosophers. Buddha logically perfects this view into the doctrine of impermanence. His later followers develop this further into a theory of momentariness (kṣaṇika - Vāda), which means not only that everything has conditional and, therefore, non-permanent existence, but also that things last not ever for short periods of time, but exist for one partless moment only. This doctrine of momentariness of all things is supported by later writers with elaborate arguments, one of which may be briefly noticed here: The criterion of the existence (sattā) of a thing is its capacity to produce some effect (arthakriyāritva- lakṣaṇam sat). A nonexistent thing, like a hare's horn, cannot produce any effect. Now, form this criterion of existence, it may be deduced that a thing having existence must be momentary. If, for example, a thing like a seed be not accepted to be momentary, but thought to be lasting for more than one moment, then we have to show that it is capable of producing and effect during each moments. then it should be able to produce the same effect at every one of those moments. But we find this is not the case. The seed in the house does not produce the seeding which is generated by a seed sown in the field. The seed in the house cannot then be the same as that in the field. But it may be said that though the seed does not actually produce the same effect always, it always has the potentiality to produce it, and this potentiality becomes kinetic in the presence of suitable auxiliary conditions like earth, water, etc. Therefore, the seed is always the same. But this defence is weal; because then it is virtually confessed that the seed of the first moment
is not the cause of the seeding, but that the seed modified by the other conditions really causes the effect. Hence the seed must be admitted to have changed. In this way it may be shown regarding everything that it does not stay unchanged during any two moments, because it does not produce the identical effect during both moments. Hence everything lasts only for a moment.

Anātmavāda

The law of change is universal; neither man, nor any other being, animate or inanimate, is exempt from it. It is commonly believed that in man there is an abiding substance called the soul (ātma), which persists through changes that overcome the body, exists before birth and after death, and migrates from one body to another. Consistently with his theories of conditional existence and universal change, Buddha denies the existence of such soul. But how, it may be asked, does he then explain the continuity of a person through different births, or even through the different states of childhood, youth and old age? Though denying the continuity of an identical substance in man, Buddha does not deny the continuity of the stream of successive states that compose his life. Life is an unbroken series of states: each of these states depends on the condition just preceding and given rise to the one just succeeding it. The continuity of the life series is, therefore, based on a causal connection running through the different states. This continuity is often explained with the example of a lamp burning throughout the night. The flame of each moment is dependent on its own conditions and different from that of another moment which is dependent on other conditions. Yet there is an unbroken succession of the different flames. Again, as from one flame another may be lighted, and though the two are different, they are connected causally, similarly, the endstate of this life may cause the beginning of the next. Rebirth is, therefore, not transmigration, i.e. the migration of the same soul into another body; it is the causation of the next life by the present. The conception of a soul is thus replaced here by that of an unbroken stream of consciousness as in the philosophy of William James. As the present state of consciousness inherits its characters from previous ones, the past in a way continues in the present, through its effect. Memory thus becomes explicable even without a soul. This theory of the non-existence of soul (Anātta - Vāda) plays a very important part in understanding the teaching of Buddha. He, therefore, repeatedly exhorts his disciples to give up the false view about the self. Buddha points out that people who suffer from the illusion of the self, do not know its nature clearly; still they strongly protest that they love the soul; they want to make the soul happy by obtaining salvation. This, he, wittily remarks, is like falling in love with the most beautiful maiden in the land though she has never been seen nor known. Or, it is like building a stair-case for mounting a palace which has never been seen.

Man is only a conventional name for a collection of different constituents the material body (kāya), the immaterial mind (manas or citta), the formless consciousness (vijñāna), just as chariot is a collection of wheels, axles, shafts, etc. The existence of man depends on this collection and it dissolves when the collection breaks up. The soul or the ego denotes nothing more than this collection.

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From a psychological point of view, man, as perceived from without and within, is analysable also into a collection of five groups (pañca - skandhas) of changing elements, namely, (1) form (rūpa) consisting of the different factors which we perceive in this body having form, (2) feeling (vedanā) of pleasure, pain and indifference, (3) perception including understanding and naming (saññā). (4) Predispositions or tendencies generated by the impressions of past experience (saṁskāras), and (5) consciousness itself (vijñāna). The last four are together called nāma.

**Schools of Buddhism**

Religiously Buddhism is divided into two important sects - Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Hīnayāna, like Jainism, is a religion without God, Karma taking the place of God. Relying on the words of Buddha: 'Be a light unto thyself' (atmadipo bhava), and his last words: 'And now, brethren, I take my leave of you: all the constituents of being are transitory; work out your salvation with diligence', Hīnayāna emphasises liberation for and by the individual himself. It is the difficult part of self-help. Its goal is Arhathood or the state of ideal saint who obtains personal salvation. Mahāyāna, the Great Vehicle, the Big Ship, which can accommodate a much larger number of people and can safely and securely take them to the shore of Nirvāṇa from the troubled waters of the ocean of Samsāra.

Buddhism, though primarily an ethical-religious movements thus came to give birth to about thirty schools, not counting the minor one. And some of these get into the deep waters of metaphysical speculation, heedless of the founder's warning. Of these many schools we shall first notice the four distinguished in India by Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers. In this account, (1) some Buddha philosophers are nihilists (śunya-vādī ir Mādhyamika), (2) others are subjective idealists (Vijñānavādī) or Yogācāra, (3) others again are representationalists or critical realists (Bāhyānumeya - vādī or Sautrāntika), and (4) the rest are direct realists (Bāhyapratyakṣa-vādī or Vaibhāṣika). The first two of the above four schools come under Mahāyāna and the last two under Hīnayāna. It should be noted, however, that under both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna there are many other schools.

**Mādhyamika**

The great philosophical work of Aśvaghoṣa, the Mahāyāna Shraddhotpāda-Shāstra or the 'Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna' which entitles him to the rank of the first systematic expounder of Mahāyāna. The founder of this school is said to be Nāgārjuna, who was a Brahmin born in south India about the second century A.D. Aśvaghoṣa, the author of Buddhacarita, is also regarded as a pioneer. In his famous work, Mādhyamikaśāstra, Nāgārjuna states, with great dialectical skill and scholarship, the philosophy of the Mādhyamika school. Mādhyamika holds that there in nothing, mental or non-mental, which is real. The universe is śunya or void of reality. But the Mādhyamika view is not really nihilism, as ordinarily supposed, and that it does not deny all reality, but only the apparent phenomenal world perceived by us. Behind this phenomenal world there is a reality which is not describable by any character, mental or non-mental, that we perceive. Being devoid of phenomenal characters, it is called śunya. But
This is only the negative aspect of the ultimate reality: it is only a description of what it is not. In 'he Laṅkāvatāra -sūtra it is stated that the real nature of object cannot be ascertained by the intellect and cannot, therefore, be described. That which is real must be independent and should not depend on anything else its existence and origination. But everything we know of is dependent on some condition. Hence it cannot be real. Again, it cannot be said to be unreal. Because an unreal thing, like a castile in the air, can never come into existence. To say that it is both real and unreal or that it is neither real nor unreal, would be unintelligible jargon. Śūnyatā or voidness is name for this indeterminable, indescribable real nature of things.

Nāgärjuna says, "The fact of depend origination is called by us śūnyatā". "There is no dharma (character) of things which is not dependent on some other condition regarding its origin. Therefore, there is no dharma which is not śūnya". It would appear, therefore, that śūnya only means the conditional character of things, and their consequent constant changeability and indeterminability or indescribability.

The view is called the middle (madhyama) path, because it avoids extreme views by denying, for example, both absolute reality and absolute unreality of things asserting their conditional existence. This was the reason why Buddha, as we saw, called the theory of dependent origination - the middle path. And so Nāgärjuna says that śūnya - vāda is called the middle path because it implies the theory of dependent origination. It can also be interpreted as a theory of relativity. The conditionality of things which makes their own nature (svabhāva) unascertainable, either as real or unreal, etc., may be also regarded as a kind of relativity. Every character of a things is conditioned by something else and therefore its existence is relative to that condition.

The Mādhyamikas, hold that there is a transcendental reality (noumenon) behind the phenomenal one and it is free from change, conditionality and all other phenomenal characters. As Nāgärjuna says: "There are two truths, on which Buddha's teaching of Dharma depends, one is empirical (samvṛtisatya) and meant for the ordinary people, another is the transcendental or the absolutely true one (paramārtha-satya). Those who do not know the distinction between these two kinds of truth, cannot understand the profound mystery of Buddha's teachings".

The truth of the order is only a stepping -stone to the attainment of the higher. The nature of nirvāṇa- experience which takes one beyond ordinary experience cannot be described, it can only be suggested negatively with the help of words which describe our common experience. Nāgärjuna, therefore, describes nirvāṇa with a series of negatives, thus: "That which is not known (ordinarily) not acquired anew, not destroyed, not eternal, not suppressed, not generated is called nirvāṇa". As with nirvāṇa so also with the Tathāgala or one who has realized nirvāṇa. His nature also cannot be described. That is way, when Buddha was asked what becomes of the Tathāgata after nirvāṇa is attained, he declined to discuss the question.
Yogācāra

The followers of Viśṇuṇāvāda were called Viṣṇuṇāvādins and were also known as the Yogācāras because they emphasized the importance of Yoga for realization of Pure Knowledge (bodhi) in order to become Buddha by going through all the ten stages (bhūmi) of Bodhisattvahood. It is generally believed that Asaṅga is the founder of this School. Maitreyanātha is its first systematic expounder. His fame was overshadowed by his able disciple Asaṅga. Viṣṇuṇāvāda reached its zenith in Asaṅga's younger brother Vasubandhu who alone has the signal honour being called 'the Second Buddha'.

Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dinnaga are the famous teachers of this school. While agreeing with the Mādhyamikas, as to the unreality of external objects, the Yogācāra school differs from them in holding that the mind (citta) cannot be regarded as unreal. For then all reasoning and thinking would be false and the Mādhyamikas could not even establish that their own arguments were correct. To say that everything, mental or non-mental, is unreal is suicidal. The reality of the mind should at least be admitted in order to make correct thinking possible.

The mind, consisting of a stream of different kinds of ideas, is the only reality. Things that appear to be outside the mind, our body as well as other objects, are merely ideas of the mind just as in cases of dreams and hallucinations, a man fancies to perceive things outside, though they do not really exist there, similarly the objects which appear to be out there, are really ideas in the mind. The existence of any external object cannot be proved, because it cannot be shown that object is different from the consciousness of the object. An object is never known without the consciousness of it, the object cannot be proved to have an existence independent of consciousness.

The Yogācāra view is called subjective idealism, or viṣṇuṇavāda, because according to it the existence of an object perceived is not different from the subject or the perceiving mind. Holding this theory, Yogācāra also accepts that the mind is stream of momentary conscious states and within the stream there lie, buried impressions (samskara) of all past experience. At a particular moment that latent impression comes to the surface of consciousness of which the circumstances of the moment are the most favorable. At that moment that impression attains maturity (paripaka), so to say, and develops into immediate consciousness or perception. It is thus that at that particular moment only that object whose latent impression can, under the circumstances, reveal itself becomes perceived, just as in the case of the revival of past impression in memory, though all impressions are in the mind only some are remembered at a particular time. This is why only some object can be perceived at a time and not any at will.

The mind considered in its aspect of being a storehouse or home of all impression, is called by the viṣṇuṇa - vadin's Ālaya-viṣṇuṇa. It may be regarded as the potential mind and answers, to the soul of atman of other systems, with the difference that it is not one unchanging substance like the soul, but is a stream of continuously changing states. Through culture and self-control this Ālaya-viṣṇuṇa or the potential mind can gradually stop the arising of undesirable mental states and develop into the ideal state.
of nirvāṇa. Otherwise, it only gives rise to thoughts, desires, attachment which bine one more and more to the fictitious external world. The mind, the only reality according to this school, is truly its own place, it can make heaven of hell and hell of heaven.

The Yogācārās are so called either because they used to practise Yoga by which they came to realize the sole reality of mind (as Ālayavijñāna) dispelling all belief in the external world, or because they combined in them both critical inquisitiveness (yoga) and good conduct (ācāra). Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga are the famous leaders of the yogācāra schools. Laṅkāvatāra sūtra is one of its most important works.

**Soutrāntika**

This School is called Svaṭantra - Viśṇānavāda or Svaṭantra- Yogāchāra or Soutrāntika- Yogāchāra School of Buddhism. It accepts the metaphysical truth of Viṣṇānavāda that Reality is Pure consciousness and wants to support it with independent logical Arguments. It wants to combine the metaphysical Idealism of Viṣṇānavāda with the logical and epistemological Critical Realism of the Soutrāntika School. We may call it the Logical School of Buddhism. Vasubandhu's disciple Diṅnāga who founded this school is also the founder and Medieval Indian Logic. Founded by Diṅnāga, fully elaborated and explained by Dharmakīrti, developed almost to perfection by Shāntarakṣita, this school culminated in Karmalashīla, the last great teacher of Buddhism in India.

Buddhist logic is at once logic, epistemology and metaphysics combined. It is logic because it deals with syllogism (parāarthānumāna), inderence (svārthānumāna) and import of words (apoha). It is epistemology because it undertakes a thorough investigation of sense- perception (pratyakṣa), of the Validity of knowledge (pramāṇya), and of the Means of Cognition (pramāṇa). It is metaphysics because it discusses the real nature of sensation and of though and admits that Reality is supralogical. Nāgārjuna wrote Vīgrahavyāvarttanī, a logical treatise. Asaṅga introduced the Nyāya Syllogism into Buddhism, Vasubandhu wrote two logical treatises - Vādavidhi and Vādavidhāna.

The Soutrāntikas believe in the reality not only of the mind, but also of external objects. They point out that without the supposition of some external object, it is not possible to explain even the illusory appearance of external object. It one never perceived anywhere any external object, he could not say, as a Viṣṇā - vādin does, that, through illusion, consciousness appears like and external object. The phrase 'like and external object' is as meaningless as 'like the son of a barren mother' because external object is said by the Viṣṇā - vādin to the wholly unreal and never perceived. Again, the argument from the simultaneity of consciousness and object to their identity is also defective, Whenever we have the perceptions of an object like a pot is felt as external and consciousness of it as internal (i.e. to be in the mind. So the object, from the very beginning, is known to be different from and not identical with consciousness. If the pot perceived were identical with the subject, the perceiver would have said, "I am the pot". Besides, if there were not external object, the distinction between the 'consciousness of a pot' and 'the consciousness of a cloth' cold not be explained, because as consciousness both are identical; It is not only regarding the objects that they differ.
The reason why we cannot perceive at will any object at any time and place, lies in the fact that a perception depends on four different conditions and not simply on the mind. There must be the object to impart its form to consciousness, there must be the conscious mind (or the state of the mind at the just previous moment) to cause the consciousness of the form, there must be the sense to determine the kind of the consciousness, that is, whether the consciousness of that object would be visual, tactual or of any other kind. Lastly, there must be some favourable auxiliary condition, such as light, convenient position, perceptible magnitude, etc. All these combined together bring about the perception of the object. The form of the object thus generated in the mind, is the effect of the object, among other things. The existence of the objects is not of course perceived, because what mind immediately knows is the copy or representation of the object in its own consciousness. But from this it can infer the object without which the copy would not arise.

The Sautrāntika theory is, therefore, called also the theory of the inferability of external objects (Bāhyānumeya- vāda). The name 'Sautrāntika' is given to this schools because it attaches exclusive importance to the authority of the Sūtra- pīṭaka. The arguments used by this school for the refutation of subjective idealism anticipated long ago some of the most important arguments which modern Western realists like Moore use to refute the subjective idealism of Berkely. The Sautrāntika position in epistemology resembles 'representationism' or the 'copy theory of ideas' which was common among Western philosophers like Locke. This exists even not in a modified form among some critical realists.

**Vaibhāṣika**

While agreeing with the Sautrānitikas regarding the reality of both the mental and the non-mental, the Vaibhāṣikas, like many modern neo relists, point out that unless we admit that external objects are perceived by us, their existence cannot be known in any other way. Inference of fire from the perception of smoke is possible, because in the past we have perceived both smoke and fire together. One who has never perceived, fire previously can not infer its existence from the perception of smoke. If external objects were never perceived, as the Sautrāntikas hold, then they could not even be inferred, simply from their mental forms. To one unacquainted with an external object, the mental form would not appear to be the copy or the sign of the existence of an extra- mental object, but as an original thing which does not owe its existence to anything outside the mind. Either, therefore, we have to accept subjective idealism (vijñāna-vāda) or, if that has been found unsatisfactory, we must admit that the external object is directly known. The Vaibhāṣikas thus come to hold a theory of direct realism' (bāhya-pratyakṣa-vāda).

The Abhidhamma treatises formed the general foundation of the philosophy of the realists. The Vaibhāṣikas followed exclusively a particular commentary, Vibhāṣā (or Abhidhamma- mahāvibhāṣā on an abhidhamma treatise) Abhidhrama-jñāna- praṇāna). Hence their name.
The worship of Śiva or Rudra goes back to the Vedas. In the Yajurveda we have the Shatarudrīya. The Taittirīya Āraṇyaka tell us that the whole universe is the manifestation of Rudra. Some of the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and some Purāṇas glorify Śiva or Rudra. The sacred literature of the Śahivas is called Śaivāgama. Mādhavāchārya refers to the four Schools of Shaivism - Nakulīśa - Pāshupata, Śaiva, Pratyabhijñā and Rasahvāra. Besides we find mention of two more setose, Kāpālika and Kālāmukha, in Yāmuna’s Āgamaprāmāṇya. Shaivism of the ‘Śaiva’ type is further divided into Vīra Shaivism or Śakti-viśiṣṭādvaita and Śaiva Siddhānta. The former is also known as Liṅgāyata or Śatsthala.

Śaiva Siddhānta recognizes eighteen Āgamas. From the fifth to the ninth centuries many great Śaiva saints like Sambandar, Appar and Sundarar flourished in South India whose hymns constitute a magnificently rich devotional literature. The collection of these hymns is called Tirumurai. Māṇikkaṉaṉaṟaṅgaṉaṅgaṉaṅ (seventh century) has written his famous Tiruvaiyākam. Meykaṉan, the author of the Śivaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉaṉa轫
It becomes co-pervasive with Him and shares His glory and greatness.

**Kāshmira Shaivism**

This School is also known as Pratyabhijñā or Trika or Spanda System. Shiva-sūtra (said to have been revealed to Vasugupta), Vasugupta's (eighth century) Spandakārikā, Somānanda's Shivadṛṣṭi (ninth century), Utpala's Pratyabhijñāsūtra (tenth century) Abhinavagupta's Paramārthasāra, Pratyabhijñāvimarshini and Tantrāloka, and Kṣemarāja's Shivāsūtramārshini and Spandasandoha - are some of the most important works of this system. The system claims to be based on the Shaiva Āgamas.

Kāshmira Shaivism admits thirty-six tattvas or principles of cosmic manifestation. Through the five important aspects of Shakti known as chit, ānanda, ichchā, jñāna and kriyā arise Shiva, Shakti, Sadāshiva, Ishvara and Shuddhavidyā, the five transcendental tattvas. That aspect of Shakti which makes the Infinite appear as finite is the sixth Māyā tattva. It gives rise to the five Kañchukas - power (kalā), knowledge (vidyā), attachment (rāga), time (kāla) and space (niyati), Through these Māyā makes the Infinite Shiva appear as finite Puruṣa which is the twelfth tattva.

Shiva is the only reality, the one without a second. He is infinite Consciousness and absolute independence. (Svātantra). He creates everything by the mere force of His will. He is the subject as well as the object. He is the foundation of all knowledge and all proof and disproof equally presuppose His existence.

Recognition (pratyabhijñā) of this reality is essential for obtaining liberation. The liberated soul becomes one with Shiva and ever enjoys the mystic bliss of oneness with the Lord. Jīvanmukti is admitted.

**Śhākta Schools**

The worship of Śakti also dates back to the Rgveda. The Śivas made her the consort of Śiva. The various Purāṇas describe her greatness. She is known as Śakti, Devī, Chaṇḍī, Chāmuṇḍā, Durgā, Umā and Mahāmāyā. Śakti is the power of Existence, Knowledge and Bliss of Brahman and is inseparable from it. Śakti may be taken as male, female or neutral. Śiva is the pure undeterminate Brahman, while Śakti, the power of Māyā, makes him determinate, endowed with the attributes of knowledge, will and action. The whole world of matter and souls exists potentially in Śakti who is the inseparable power of Śiva. Māyā or Prakṛti, the matrix of the world, lies within Śakti. Jīvanmukti is admitted and the mystic side of Yoga is emphasized in this School. Mantra and Tantra are sacred, secret and divine. Awakening of the Kunḍalinī and piercing of the six Chakras is practiced. Nādayoga is glorified.

The Śakti Tantra is divided into three Schools - Kauṭa, Samaya and Miśra. Bhāskararāya, the author of Saubhāgyabhāskara, the commentary on Lalitāsahasranāma, and Lakṣmīdharā, the commentator on the Saundaryalaharī are the eminent Śhākta writers. Kula means Śakti or Kunḍalinī and Akula means Śiva. He alone is therefore a Kauṭa who succeeds in uniting Śhakti with Śiva.

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